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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation: Trade facilitation for landlocked developing countries: A 
case study of the Palestinian territories 
 
Degree: M.Sc. 
 
Trade facilitation is important to ease the challenges facing landlocked countries 
such as geographical obstacles, infrastructure level and information and 
communication technology. More specifically, the main barriers causing slow 
economic growth are the border crossings, customs and security inspections. 
The Palestinian economy is effectively landlocked, although the Gaza strip on the 
Mediterranean Sea has a 60 Km long shore. The Palestinian territories have since 2000 
effectively been isolated from the rest of the world due to the closure policy imposed by 
the Israeli government 
 
This dissertation outlines problems affecting trade facilitation in the Palestinian 
Territories, and makes some suggestions that could help to solve those problems. 
Well established and developed border crossing logistics enhance cost effective, 
secure and efficient services 
The future of the Palestinian economy depends mainly on the enhancement of the 
trade logistics system, which permits a secure, reliable and competitive trading 
environment. Gaza Seaport would be a cornerstone for economic development of 
Palestine. The construction of Gaza Seaport by the Palestinian Authority would 
enable direct access to the market, and as a result would be the growth engine of the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank economy to expand and diversify foreign trade and 
stimulate growth in the external trade oriented industries. Moreover, the territorial 
link between the two separated regions of the Palestinian territory should be 
established as soon as possible to guarantee full economic integration. 
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Lastly, trade facilitation is the only torch that could light the way for the Palestinian 
economy to recover and achieve a competitive position. 
 
KEYWORDS: Landlocked countries, Trade facilitation, Border crossings, Supply 
chain security, Closure policy, Multimodal Transport, Palestine 
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1 CHAPTER ONE 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
Landlocked countries are faced with a unique situation that resists the response to 
trade facilitations such as the geographical obstacles, the level of infrastructure and 
the information and communication technology in facilitating the trade. The main 
barriers causing the slow economic growth are the border crossings, customs and 
security inspections. 
The Palestinian economy is effectively landlocked, although the Gaza strip on the 
Mediterranean Sea has a 60 Km long shore. The Palestinian territories have since 
2000 effectively been isolated from the rest of the world due to the closure policy 
imposed by the Israeli government. In addition, the Israeli control over the main 
borders and transport routes is creating a complete dependency of trade on the 
political conditions. Moreover, the Palestinian dependency on Israeli port facilities 
for exports and imports have resulted in high transaction cost and unreliable logistics 
with the security measures at the border crossings and customs clearance having 
rendered trade difficult and hampered its growth. 
 
The most effective solution to integrate the Palestinian economy with the region and 
the rest of the world is to have a seaport in Gaza, but the conflict and instability in 
the region will effect and delay the construction of the seaport. For that it is essential 
to explore other alternatives for facilitating the flow of the Palestinian trade until the 
construction of the Gaza seaport. Consequently, the Palestinian Authority should 
improve and develop the transport infrastructure, especially the road and border 
crossing facilities.  
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The consideration of diversifying the trade partners could be one of the alternatives 
for facilitation of the flow of goods to the Palestinian territory to balance the relation 
with Israel through greater regional integration, enhancing multimodal transport. 
1.2 Problem identification and objective of the study 
The multiple obstacles and procedures facing the Palestinian traders contribute 
significantly to hampering the trade, with costs and unreliable logistics, which reduce 
their ability to compete in the international market. The security concerns of the 
Israeli government have an impact on the movement and access within the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip and at the international borders of the Palestinian territory. 
 
The dissertation assesses different options for the future Palestinian trade regime, 
while acknowledging that the restrictions on movements of goods and people have 
had a negative impact on the Palestinian trade performance. In addition, it discusses 
what the Palestinian Authority should do to achieve a reliable and low transaction 
cost for the traders. The study suggests different alternatives for the Palestinian 
Authority to benefit from a reliable and low cost supply chain.  
This study is trying to answer the following questions: How to deal with these 
obstacles?  What are the problems that do exist in relation to these obstacles? How to 
minimise these obstacles? What can be the other alternatives for the Palestinian 
Authority? 
1.3 Scope of the study 
The scope of the study is limited to analysing the problem of the Palestinian trade 
disadvantages, and determining the alternative routes for trade facilitation in the 
Palestinian territories. 
Well established and developed border crossing logistics enhance cost effective, 
secure and efficient services. The main idea and overall goal of this dissertation is to 
realize the border crossing regime and what can be done toward creating efficient 
and secure transit services at the border crossings. 
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1.4 Methodology 
Firstly, a literature review were conducted regarding the development of LLDCs 
using different Web sites; publications by UNCTAD, the World Bank and the World 
Trade Organization; other reports and documents related to trade facilitation in 
landlocked countries and the Palestinian territories. 
 
The design of this study is descriptive and analytical to find the relationship between 
economic development and trade facilitation in the Palestinian territories. The study 
was discussed trade barriers in LLDCs and demonstrated the relationship between 
being LLDCs and the economic activity of exporting and importing. And from the 
literature review of landlocked countries and Palestinian territories the dissertation 
presented alternatives approaches to enhance trade facilitation in the Palestinian 
territories. 
Trade facilitation is composed of: 
• Transport and communication infrastructure 
• National and institutional policies and capacity 
• Security 
• Operational issues 
Figure 1 show these four components combined to determine the level required to 
gain efficient trade facilitation; the sum of these factors will determine the 
competitiveness of the trade in the Palestinian territories. The study was focused on 
these four factors to show the necessity to facilitating trade and controlling efficient 
and effective flow of cargo, people and information for the purpose of enhancing 
trade competitiveness in order to gain national welfare.  
In order to formulate adequate trade facilitation, as a starting point the study assessed 
the current situation. 
The study showed the effect of these factors on the Palestinian trade. The forecast of 
the future traffic that would go through the Palestinian territories which would 
require adequate development polices in each one of the four factors to enhance trade 
facilitation. 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Dimensions of trade facilitation in the Palestinian territories 
 
Source: The Author 
 
1.5 Organization of the study 
Chapter two defines the problem of landlocked countries and the obstacles that can 
raise the transaction and transportation costs. The chapter highlights the main 
barriers causing slow economic growth in LLDCs 
 
Chapter three of the study highlights the border crossing regime and the main 
problems of the movement and access in the Palestinian territory and assesses the 
border activities in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The end of the chapter clarifies 
how these problems affect the economy and trade. In addition, it highlights the 
problems with the Jordan Valley and Paris Protocol. 
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Chapter four in the study forecasts the future Palestinian imports and exports to show 
that with the current border crossing regime, the borders are the main bottleneck in 
accommodating this growth in the traffic. The chapter identifies four necessary 
elements that the border crossing regime should possess. 
 
Chapter five suggests interim solutions that enhance trade facilitation for the 
Palestinians, by facilitating the movement and access. These solutions include: 
border crossing approach, rerouting the trade with other neighbouring countries, 
development of the Rafah corridor, establishment of Gaza seaport and the 
establishment of the territorial link. 
 
Chapter six suggests a multimodal transport system as a solution for the future 
independent Palestinian state. The chapter highlights different trading routes with 
different modes of transport and compares the total logistic cost of each route, with 
emphasis on the importance of ICTs. 
 
Chapter seven goes through the conclusions and recommendations for the Palestinian 
Authority to implement the previous approaches and facilitate the flow of goods. 
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2 CHAPTER TWO 
2 TRADE FACILITATION AND THE CHALLENGES IN LLDCS 
2.1 Introduction  
Trade facilitation has become one of the main challenges in the international trade 
agenda and this due to the costs that arise from the delays at borders, which exceed 
the costs of applied tariffs. Trading allows countries to participate in the world 
economy. Thus, it follows that the cost of trade, especially the transport cost, is a 
very important indicator for measuring the ability of a country to participate in the 
world economy. Trade facilitation brings benefits to stakeholders including 
governments, enterprises and consumers, by enhancing the efficiency of the supply 
chains, which increases the competitiveness (OECD, 2006). There is a no specific 
definition for trade facilitation in the public domain; but in a specific sense trade 
facilitation can be addressed as the logistic movement of goods through the supply 
chain, or more precisely moving documentation that is related with cross border trade. 
It is the main concern of many international organizations, with different or similar 
definitions such as :( Wilson, Mann, & Otsuki, March, 2003, pp. 4 and 23)  
WTO and UNCTAD: “simplification and harmonization of international trade 
procedures, including activities, practices, and formalities involved in collecting, 
presenting, communicating, and processing data required for the movement of goods 
in international trade.” 
OECD: “Simplification and standardization of procedures and associated 
information flows required to move goods internationally from seller to buyer and to 
pass payments in the other direction”. 
UN/ECE:  
A comprehensive and integrated approach to reducing the complexity and cost of 
the trade transactions process, and ensuring that all these activities can take place in 
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an efficient, transparent, and predictable manner, based on internationally accepted 
norms, standards, and best practices. 
APEC:  
Trade facilitation generally refers to the simplification, harmonization, use of 
new technologies, and other measures to address procedural and 
administrative impediments to trade. The use of technologies and techniques 
which will help members to build up expertise, reduce costs and lead to better 
movement of goods and services. 
International transportation services have improved very fast over the past decades 
and with the progress in standardization and trade liberalization, and cheaper 
transport services, these become one of the main elements that contribute to the 
economic globalization and integration of production processes globally (Sanchez et 
al., 2003). Despite improvements in transport services, the landlocked developing 
countries still face the challenge of being a part of the world markets for many 
reasons. 
Firstly, landlocked countries are faced with a unique situation that resists the 
response to trade facilitations such as the geographical obstacles, the level of 
infrastructure in the transit country and the landlocked country, the human resources 
and their capability to run the transit operation smoothly and the effect of 
information and communication technology in facilitating the trade for the 
landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) (Faye, Mcarthur, Sachs, & Snow, March, 
2004). 
Secondly, in some countries the port industry is the main contributor to the gross 
domestic product (GDP), which is not the case with landlocked countries. As a result, 
the LLDCs lag behind the costal countries in overall development and international 
trade. LLDCs are faced with slow economic growth just by being landlocked 
countries. For example, a study was done in 1995 which stated that the import share 
in the GDP of landlocked countries was on average 11 percent, whereas at the same 
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time the share in costal states was 28 percent. To overcome this problem, the LLDCs 
have to work more in trade facilitation to place the LLDCs in a competitive position 
in the world market (Limão & Venables, 2001). 
More specifically, the main barriers causing the slow economic growth in LLDCs are 
the border crossings, customs and security inspections, among many other obstacles.  
 LLDCs, i.e. countries without direct access to the sea and thus also to maritime trade, 
face very specific challenges. Compared with their coastal neighbouring countries, 
they are forced to transit their merchandise, exports and imports, through other 
countries. The disadvantage of LLDCs is being dependent on the neighbouring 
countries for their external trade and, moreover, on cross-border political relations, 
peace and stability in the country and many other factors (UNCTAD, 2005a). LLDCs 
have a lower economic growth, less investment and lower share in trade 
globalization and production as compared to other developing countries and the main 
reason for this in the lack of development and inadequate trade facilitation and 
transport connectivity (UNCTAD, 2006). Landlocked developing countries are 
facing many other obstacles, which reduce their capabilities to be in a competitive 
position to trade internationally, such as low per capita GDP, low income level, low 
level of economic development and limited domestic savings capacity. Due to these 
factors they have high transport costs and high prices compared with international 
markets (UNCTAD, 2005a). In addition to these, the high transaction costs weigh 
heavily on the development in the exports and limit their competitiveness in trade. 
The main obstacles for LLDCs to be a part of the competitive global trading system 
are the high costs related to transportation and transaction costs (UNCTAD, 2005a).  
2.2 Challenges facing LLDCs 
The first challenge is the high total transport cost which can be divided into three 
categories: transportation within the country’s borders, transportation through transit 
countries, and sea transportation to the final destination. In addition, the 
transportation through transit countries introduces uncertainty about future value of 
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the transported goods. Different factors that act individually or in combination affect 
the total cost. These factors are: (UNCTAD, 2005a) 
1. Undeveloped infrastructure facilities at the border crossings and the way to 
seaports either in LLDCs country or in transit country, which burden the 
transit cost. 
2. More charges related to the cargo movement such as cargo handling, 
insurance, banking. 
3. Customs act as cost barriers and so do the national holidays and closure of 
border crossings in the transit country. 
4. Logistic costs due to the delays, the need to achieve contacts and corruption. 
5. High inventory cost due to the unpredictability of trade flows  
Secondly, the factors which influence the transport costs of LLDCs are the following: 
(UNCTAD, 2005a) 
1. Overland (rail/road) transport costs are higher than sea transport. An extra 
1,000 km by sea may add $190 to transport costs, while the same increase in 
land distance may add $1,380.
 
 
2. Using of multimodal transport chains to export from LLDCs involves costly 
modes of transport.  
3. The quality of port administration and/or port infrastructure also influences 
the cost of transport  
2.3 Transport costs and LLDCs trade 
Distance is a main determinant in road transport costs beside the massive investment 
in road infrastructure, which is not the case with water transport, so the distance is a 
major factor for countries trading by land or countries located far away from seaports 
compared to economic centres located near their seaports (UNCTAD, 2006). 
Most LLDCs import mainly manufactured goods at rates higher than exports, which 
leaves a trade deficit. At the same time the cost for import will be higher because the 
freight also includes the transport of empty trucks or containers back to their place of 
origin. Due to the trade imbalance, the transport costs for exports are often lower 
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than imports because the trucking company will be satisfied by having cargo onboard 
rather than driving back empty, so in this case it is not so much the high transport 
costs for exports that can determine the competitiveness of the LLDCs. Rather it is 
the delay and uncertainty of delivery times. The delay can be anticipated at any stage 
of the transit chain but the most influencing one can be the delay happening in the 
main interface point between the land transport and the maritime transport and at the 
national borders (UNCTAD, 2003), which result in high transport costs and long 
delivery times leading to high production costs for the goods that are exported. 
Moreover, the low trade volume from LLDCs leads to high transport costs due to the 
theory of economy of scale (UNCTAD, 2006).  
Border crossings are the most critical points that need action to be taken. 
1. To develop the infrastructure and shared facilities as stated in the 
International Convention on the Harmonization of Frontier Control of Goods 
(1982) 
2. Coordination between all border control services such as customs, police and 
private sector agencies. This can be done through adequate information 
system management (UNCTAD, 2003). 
Moreover, development of adequate national transport networks and efficient transit 
transport systems are critical. Due to the lack of adequate transport connectivity and 
high transport costs in landlocked countries, the shape of trade patterns are at high 
risk of isolation from international trade and transport networks. Therefore, adequate 
transport connectivity is a key factor that has to be of great concern for LLDCs 
(UNCTAD, 2006).  
2.4 Dependence on other countries’ transit routes to access market 
Landlocked countries are not only faced with transit costs and other costs, but also 
face the challenges resulting from the complete dependency on the transit country to 
access the global market. This dependence can be classified into two categories. 
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Dependence on transit countries’ infrastructure 
The total dependency of the landlocked countries on the transit country’s 
infrastructure, to transfer their goods can lead to two options: either good 
infrastructure, which will enhance the trade, or a weak infrastructure environment, 
which will result in limiting the ability of the landlocked country to compete in the 
global market due to the limited opportunities (Faye et al., March, 2004). 
Dependence on political relations 
A landlocked country depends on its political relationship with the transit countries. 
If a conflict exists between the transit country and the landlocked country, then the 
transit country can block the borders or adopt a rigged regulation that can hamper the 
trade (Faye et al., March, 2004).  
A number of international conventions provide a general legal framework for the 
freedom and the right of the landlocked countries to access markets through transit 
countries. As stated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) Article 125(1): 
Land-locked States shall have the right of access to and from the sea for the 
purpose of exercising the rights provided for in this Convention including 
those relating to the freedom of the high seas and the common heritage of 
mankind. To this end, land-locked States shall enjoy freedom of transit 
through the territory of transit States by all means of transport.   
But this access must be agreed upon between both countries as per Article 125(2) 
and (3) and this right can be determined by the relation between them. 
Moreover, the convention states in article127(1) and 130(1) that “the traffic in transit 
shall not be subjected to any taxes or duties” and “Transit States shall take all 
appropriate measures to avoid delays or other difficulties of a technical nature in 
traffic in transit” (United Nations, 1982). 
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2.5 Trade facilitation and development 
Trade facilitation is the cornerstone of international trade mainly due to the costs that 
trade bears through the different stages of the supply chain, especially at the border 
crossings (OECD, 2006). This cost can be high, especially with the massive growth 
of the trade volume resulting in increasing the pressure on the international trade 
infrastructure and the customs procedures. As a result, there is an increase in the 
demand to facilitate the trade through expanding the transportation network, with 
more efficient use of information systems and more efficient customs clearance at 
the international borders. The development of logistic systems leads to traders 
holding lower levels of stock with the use of an integrated global supply chain.  
In addition, the introduction of the just on time approach and the use of Electronic 
Data Interchange (EDI) have increased the pressure on the supply chain, which has 
resulted in reducing the competitiveness of landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) 
with a great degree of risk every time the goods cross international borders. 
Moreover, the exporting countries have to go through new security measures that 
make development more difficult to achieve (OECD, 2006). 
The trade of landlocked countries depends mainly on the transit countries to access 
global markets through the ports in neighbouring countries, thus their 
competitiveness in the international market does not only depend on modernization 
and standardization at home but also on the transit trade and transport procedures in 
the transit countries. Therefore, investment is needed from both transit countries and 
landlocked countries, with specific arrangements to gain benefit from the cooperation 
between them. The increased volume of trade permits economies of scale and cost 
savings, which will increase the trade flows and enhance economic growth 
(UNCTAD, 2006). 
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2.6 Benefits of trade facilitation  
Trade facilitation acts as a tool to enhance the efficiency of the supply chain and, as a 
result, improves competitiveness, which helps attracting foreign direct investments, 
enhances revenue collection and combats corruption (OECD, 2006).  
These result in using the resources more efficiently and effectively, which will have 
positive consequences on the country’s development (OECD, 2006). The trade 
suffers from both direct costs, such as costs related to information and document 
procedures, and indirect costs, such as cost of delays, missed opportunities, and lack 
of reliability. An estimation done by OECD suggests that transaction costs may range 
from 2% to 15% of the value of the traded goods, and any reduction in these costs, 
which can be done through efficient customs procedures and formalities, will have a 
great positive impact on the international trade and in turn affect the economic 
growth. The suggestion estimated that a reduction of 1% would have an impact on 
the global welfare of 40 billion USD with non-OECD countries having two thirds of 
this gain. 
The trade taxes have an important share of the overall government revenue. In this 
regard the main goal behind trade facilitation is to increase the revenue. Beside all of 
these, trade facilitation enhances the governance in partner countries through 
compliance with best practices and reduces corruption and smuggling (OECD, 2006). 
Trade facilitation, such as transit transport systems and joint border operations, help 
to enhance trade with neighbouring countries and help to promote the industries that 
are sensitive to time and distance, particularly high value goods that may be traded 
by air transport. Most trade facilitation will have an efficient result if there is 
improvement in the general standardization, harmonization and simplification of 
many import and export procedures, and benefit the transit trade procedures with 
regional agreements and simplified cargo clearance systems (UNCTAD, 2006). 
Achieving high trade and transport facilitation objectives mainly depends on the 
ability of the countries to know their priorities, which is very essential in the 
negotiation of trade agreements, whether they are bilateral, regional or multilateral. 
Priority setting should be based on the analysis of countries’ trade flows and 
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structure, mode of transportation used, projection for trade growth, and their 
geographical position (UNCTAD, 2006). The benefit from trade facilitation can be 
very important for developing countries and in particular for small and medium size 
enterprises (SMEs) in the sense that demolishing of trade barriers and inefficiencies 
can be more important than just reducing the tariffs. Trade facilitation results in 
direct benefits to both Governments and business; Governments benefit in terms of 
revenue collection, better security and increased economic efficiency, while traders 
gain from the fast delivery of goods and reduced transportation and transaction costs. 
In this sense trade facilitation enhances the capacity of SMEs to participate in 
international trade. 
 
Trade and transport facilitation must not be just narrowed to border crossing trade 
operations, but must be taken as a development tool to achieve efficient trade 
operations, develop human capacities, legal framework, infrastructure and the use of 
information technology systems to achieve the goal of trade facilitation.  
The use of trade facilitation as a tool of development will help to introduce high 
transparency in customs procedures with the use of information and communication 
technology, which may contribute to overcome the problem of corruption (UNCTAD, 
2006). Trade facilitation can be a tool for Governments and the trading community to 
improve international trade by simplification of formalities and procedures, 
standardization of physical facilities and means and the harmonization of applicable 
laws and regulations (UNCTAD, 2006).  
Furthermore, trade facilitation cannot be treated separately from a country’s overall 
development. Facilitation measures and development measures are moving side by 
side, such as per-capita income and the correlation between the average clearance 
times, number of required signatures and number of documents, which shows that 
there is a positive relation between these and the country’s income (see Table 1). 
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Table 1: Correlation between trade facilitation indicators and income level 
 
Income level 
of countries 
Average clearance 
time in days 
Average number of 
documents required 
Average number of 
signatures required 
Rich 16 7 4 
Upper middle 28 10 9 
Lower middle 40 12 16 
Poor 61 13 28 
Source: (UNCTAD, 2005b) 
2.7 Border and transportation security 
Border and transportation security is one of the major elements in enhancing trade 
facilitation. Border security is demanding regulation to allow the flow of goods 
across the borders, but in a way so that the dangerous and unwanted goods are denied 
to cross. This requires a comprehensive border management system that balances the 
security needs and the trade flows. The attack on 9/11 has changed the face of the 
world, putting more pressure and more emphasis on the security not only in aviation, 
but in all modes of transport, which has hampered the trade facilitation developments. 
The focus has turned onto container cargo. Since 90% of global trade by value is 
transported in containers, new equipment has been introduced to achieve a high level 
of security, resulting in increasing the cost on the global supply chain. At the same 
time the prospect of enhancing trade through technology, customs inspections and 
other advanced methods should be viewed as investments in enhancing great trade 
chain security, which will result in reducing the threat and adding greater value of 
transparency. The use of innovative technologies like gamma ray detection facilities 
will reduce the need for physical inspections (Roy & Bagai, 2005).  
For high level of security and efficient trade, security and supply chain management 
have to go hand in hand and a fair balance should exist. Thus partnerships at 
different stages of the supply chain are needed to make the supply chain both 
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efficient and secure, also by involving all agencies and organizations in the transport 
to collaborate with the governments. 
In this regard, ships, truck, and railroads must begin to build a security infrastructure, 
as the transportation of cargo is critical to the international economy and the 
facilitation has to be up to the standards but there must be no compromise with 
security. This can be achieved through new technology and new regulations that 
place both in the top priority. As an example development in technology starts to 
provide the trucking companies with innovations in security and communications, 
including satellite tracking, locks and seals, alarms and engine controls such as 
engine kill switches which can be activated locally or remotely, and transponders and 
transmitters that can provide the location of the truck via satellite. 
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3 CHAPTER THREE 
3 IMPACT OF BORDER CROSSINGS ON THE PALESTINIAN 
ECONOMY 
 
The author’s main interest in landlocked countries has been demonstrated from the 
situation going on in Palestine as the economy is in decline. Although the state of 
Palestine is a costal state, it is considered to be a landlocked country where 
practically all goods have to be transported through Israeli ports and cross the 
borders by land transportation to either the Gaza Strip or the West Bank. Therefore, 
Palestine faces the same trade related issues as other traditional LLDCs do. 
3.1 Geographic location, infrastructure 
The Palestinian territories consist of two geographically separated regions, the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, with a total population of 3.6 million, distributed as 1.3 
million in the Gaza Strip and 2.3 million in the West Bank. The Palestinian territory 
lies on the western edge of the Asian continent and the eastern side of the 
Mediterranean Sea. It is small in area, covering 6225 km2, of which 365 km2 in the 
Gaza Strip borders Israel to the north and east, the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula to the 
south, and the Mediterranean Sea to the west and 5860 km2 are in the West Bank 
located between Israel to the West and Jordan to the East to constitute about 23 per 
cent of the area of the pre-1948 British Mandate. The road network forms the 
backbone of the transportation system in the Palestinian territories. The current 
paved road network in the Palestinian territories comprises of 2869 km, of which 
2248 are in the West Bank and 621 km in the Gaza Strip. The main roads form about 
21% of the total road network, the regional roads form about 30%, while local roads 
form 49%. The road infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip can be 
characterized as generally suffering from neglect and the impacts of the Israeli 
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occupation since 1967. When the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was 
established in 1994, the percentage of roads in good condition formed only 15% of 
the total, while the percentage of poor roads reached 56%, and the remaining 29% 
were in fair condition (Abu Eisheh & AlSahili, 2006). 
However, despite the long seacoast of the Gaza strip, international trades are 
completely depending on the neighbouring countries, especially Israel. In addition, 
Israel controls the main borders, and without access to the sea makes the Palestinian 
territories effectively landlocked, and totally dependent on the political and security 
developments, which prevent the participation of the Palestinian enterprises from 
increasing their competitiveness in the international trade (United Nations, 2004). 
3.2 Assessment of Gaza Strip commercial terminals 
There are six crossing points in the Gaza strip used as trade terminals. These 
terminals are used for handling the imported and exported goods. Four of these 
terminals are fully controlled by the Israeli authorities, while the Rafah terminal is 
partially controlled by Palestinian Authorities. The last one is the new terminal, 
which was classified in the Agreement on Movement and Access 2005 (AMA). The 
terminal will be used to import goods from Egypt and is under full control of Israel.  
3.2.1 AlMontar/ Karni Terminal 
The terminal is considered as the major 
commercial terminal in the Gaza strip, 
located at the east of the Gaza, connecting 
it to the West Bank, Israel, and the rest of 
the world. As stated in AMA 2005, the 
terminal suffers from inefficiency and 
insecurity, where as agreed in the 
agreement the number of trucks that should 
be processed is 150 daily and by the end of 
Figure 2: Crossing points at Gaza Strip 
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2006 should reach 400 trucks daily, but at the end of 2007 the actual number of 
trucks was only 70 daily. Out of 313 available working days in 2007 the terminal 
operated only 133 days. The total of imported truckloads to the Gaza strip was 
60,270 and a total of 5,746 truckloads were exported. Between 2000 and 2004 the 
terminal had a relatively constant import of on average 79,000 truckloads, in 2005 
the average increased by 30%, to drop again in 2006 and 2007 by 42%. The export 
level between 2000 and 2005 fluctuated with an average of 10,000 truckloads. In 
2006 this trend declined by 50% of the export average as compared with the previous 
trend and in 2007 was 45% lower than the average as shown in the Figures 3 and 4.  
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Figure 3: Truckloads movement at AL Montar terminal 
Source: Author, Paltrade database http://mail.paltrade.org/hanna/crossing/get_monthly.php 
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Figure 4: Export and import truckloads and operation days at Karni terminal 
Source: Author, Paltrade database http://mail.paltrade.org/hanna/crossing/get_monthly.php 
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The number of operation days for July 2007 to April 2008 showed a decline with an 
average of 8 working days per month. In addition to that, the number of imported 
truckloads for the same period averaged 500 per month as compared to 8800 
truckloads monthly for the period from Jan 2007 to Jun 2007. Furthermore, the 
export has been stopped since July 2007 until now, but even before that the number 
of truckloads was unsatisfactory. An assessment of the exports, carried out by the 
United Nations after one year of implementing the AMA 2005, for the Karni 
terminal is illustrated in Figure 5. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Export through Karni Crossing 2006 
Source: (OCHAOPT, NOV, 2006) 
3.2.2 Nahal Oz Entry Point 
This terminal is located as shown in Figure 2 east of the Gaza strip and is mainly 
utilized for petroleum products imported only from Israel. The terminal consists of 
storage tanks and gas tanks linked directly with pipelines to the Israeli side. The 
terminal, in November 2007, faced a decline in the imported fuel by 25% and in 
December by 14% as shown in Figure 6. Where the average fuel imported from 
January 2007 to December 2007 was 17.6 million litres per month, and from January 
2008 till April 2008 it declined to an average of 11.8 million litres. There was an 
increase in the imported gas for the same period and this can be explained by the use 
of gas as fuel for cars in the Gaza strip as a substitute for the shortage in fuel. This 
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decrease in the import, similarly to the case with the Karni terminal, reflects the 
closure policy Israel imposed on the Palestinian Authority. 
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Figure 6: Imported fuel through Nahal Oz 
Source: Author, Paltrade database http://mail.paltrade.org/hanna/crossing/get_monthly.php 
3.2.3 Sufa Terminal 
The terminal, located in the south of the Gaza Strip, has been utilized for the imports 
of construction materials. The terminal has been used after the closure policy, which 
has been implemented on the Palestinian Authorities, as an alternative to the Karni 
terminal for importing goods that are considered as humanitarian to avoid a crisis in 
the Gaza Strip. Figure 7 shows the terminal trend in 2007 for the number of 
truckloads and the operational days in the terminal, where in June 2007 the number 
of truckloads dropped to 159 imported truckloads with 8 working days during the 
month.  Moreover, the terminal is still subjected to the closure policy and the trend 
shows a decline since August 2007 until January 2008 and then starts relatively 
increasing from February 2008. This is a reflection of the security concerns of the 
Israeli Government and the poor political relationship between the Palestinian 
Authority and the Israeli government. 
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Figure 7: Import truckloads and operation days at Sufa terminal 
Source: Author, Paltrade database http://mail.paltrade.org/hanna/crossing/get_monthly.php 
3.2.4 Karem Abu Salem/Kerem Shalom Crossing 
The terminal is new as has been agreed in AMA, and is located 3.6Km away from 
the Rafah terminal, and used temporarily for importing goods. The terminal has been 
used as an alternative to the Karni terminal to import goods that are considered as 
humanitarian. The trend in June was 132 truckloads with 7 working days/ month and 
increased to 1065 in December 2007 with 23 working days/ month. 
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Figure 8: Export and import truckloads and operation days at Karem Abu Salam 
Source: Author, Paltrade database http://mail.paltrade.org/hanna/crossing/get_monthly.php 
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3.2.5 Beit Hanoun/ Erez Terminal 
The terminal is located in the north of the Gaza strip connecting it with Israel and the 
West Bank. This terminal is mainly used by civilians as labour, medical cases, 
diplomats, businessmen and international organization staff, with a permit from the 
Israeli authorities. Moreover, the terminal is used to import cars (PALTRADE, 2008). 
3.2.6 Rafah Border Terminal 
The terminal is located in the South of the Gaza strip and is mainly utilized for 
passenger crossing from and to Egypt and was used as a cargo crossing point until 
2005. The control of the border in 2005 was transferred to the Palestinian Authority 
and under the supervision of the European community, after Israel’s disengagement 
from the Gaza Strip (PALTRADE, 2008). An assessment carried out by the United 
Nations after one year from implementing the AMA 2005 for the Rafah terminal is 
illustrated in Figure 9. At the moment the terminal is effectively totally closed by the 
government of Israel, as a third party in the border management since April 2007, 
which is imposing a restriction on the movement of persons and goods through the 
terminal into and out of the Gaza strip affecting the social and commercial activities 
of the Palestinian Authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Operation of Rafah Crossing 2006 
Source: (OCHAOPT, NOV, 2006) 
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3.3 Assessment of the West Bank commercial terminals  
3.3.1 Tarqumia Terminal 
The terminal is located northwest 
of Hebron in the south of the 
West Bank 150 meters west of the 
Tarqumia checkpoint serving the 
cities of Hebron and southern 
cities of the West Bank. It is used 
for import and export from/to 
Israel. There is no presence of 
Palestinians in the terminal, 
which was opened by the Israeli 
government in October 2007 
(PALTRADE, April, 2008). The 
border has been opened according 
to the Sharm al-Sheikh 
convention. 1  In the September 
1999 Sharm al-Sheikh  
Memorandum, the parties pledged  
 
to facilitate the movement and transfer of goods between the West Bank, Gaza and 
Israel. In practice, like other checkpoints throughout the occupied Palestinian 
territories, those who are hoping to cross will be subjected to body searches, 
document checks and many other difficulties. The border will be used for 
transferring goods, workers and merchants between the West Bank, Gaza Strip and 
Israel (Wardeh, November, 2007). Figure 11 shows the movement of trucks through 
                                                 
1 For more information about the convention please refer to : 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/2001/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/16
32064.stm 
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Figure 10: West Bank crossing terminals 
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the terminal with the number of operation days, with a trend upward for the imported 
goods from 1403 truckloads in January to 2873 truckloads in April 2008 and a slight 
increasing trend for exported goods as well. 
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Figure 11: Export and import truckloads and operation days at Tarqumia terminal 
Source: Author, Paltrade database http://mail.paltrade.org/hanna/crossing/get_monthly.php 
 
3.3.2 Betunia Terminal 
The terminal located south of Ramallah, was established in 2002 and is used for 
import and export with Israel, serving the cities of Ramallah and northern cities of 
Jerusalem. The terminal is used for manufactured products, agricultural crops, 
cement, sand and chemical products. The terminal does not have a scanner so the 
inspection is done manually. The manual checks cause delays and damages to the 
goods. The number of import truckloads in January 2008 was 840 and increased to 
1359 in April 2008 showing an upward trend as shown in Figure 12. Similarly, the 
number of export truckloads increased from 580 in January 2008 to 1,087 in April 
2008.  
 
 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 
Export and imports truckloads and operation days at Betunia 
terminal
580 618
1,093 1,087
839
1,359
840
1,477
2324
21
26
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08
2007
Tr
uc
kl
oa
ds
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
D
ay
s
Import Export operation Days Poly. (Import)
 
Figure 12: Export and import truckloads and operation days at Betunia terminal 
Source: Author, Paltrade database http://mail.paltrade.org/hanna/crossing/get_monthly.php 
3.3.3 Al Jalameh Terminal 
Al Jalameh is located north of Jenin. The terminal serves the Jenin and Nablus cities, 
and it is used for both imports and exports between the West Bank and Israel. There 
is no official Palestinian presence at the terminal which is fully under Israeli control 
(PALTRADE, April, 2008). The trucks go through scanning machines where five 
trucks are allowed to enter; in addition to this 50 to 60 percent of the trucks go 
through manual inspection. No official statistics are available about the trade 
movement. 
3.3.4 Taybeh/ Sha’ar Ephraim Terminal 
The terminal is located south of Tulkarm and was officially opened by the Israelis at 
the end of 2005. The terminal serves the cities of Nablus, Tulkarm, Qalqelia and part 
of Jenin. It is used for both imports and exports between the West Bank and Israel. 
The terminal is divided into two main sections, one for movement of goods and the 
other for the movement of people, particularly labourers. The trend of the terminal in 
Figure 13 during the months from January to April 2008 shows an increase in the 
number of truckloads especially in March with 1441 import and 1180 export 
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truckloads, which is due to the increase in the number of operation days to 25 days 
(PALTRADE, April, 2008).  
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Figure 13: Export and import truckloads and operation days at Taybeh terminal 
Source: Author, Paltrade database http://mail.paltrade.org/hanna/crossing/get_monthly.php 
 
3.4 Israeli Palestinian crossing regime 
To enhance economic growth for both the Palestinian and Israeli economies, the 
normalization and facilitation of the process to access the Israeli market would be a 
tool for recovery. Moreover, the facilitation to access the Arab market and global 
market will enhance economic recovery in the short term and act as engine for 
economic growth in the medium and long term by encouraging investment in trade 
activities (PALTRADE & Peres Centre for Peace, Feb, 2007). The border crossing 
regime is subjected to four categories of restrictions of the movement of the 
Palestinian exporters and importers 
− Internal movement within the West Bank 
− Movement between the West Bank and the Gaza strip 
− Movement across the West Bank  and Gaza to Israel and global markets  
− Direct access to Arab markets and global markets via Egypt and Jordan 
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3.4.1 Internal movement within the West Bank 
The closure policy in the West Bank which has been enforced by the Israeli 
government has imposed restrictions on the movement of 2.3 million Palestinians 
living in the West Bank. A number of checkpoints, physical obstacles and a permit 
system have divided the West Bank into three parts in addition to East Jerusalem, 
which isolated the Palestinians from the Palestinians, which has social as well as 
economical implications. In regard to trade routes, the route from the northern West 
Bank to Nablus and toward the south into the Jordan Valley is utilized for serving the 
north side, whereas goods travelling from Hebron and Bethlehem to the north go 
through longer roads in bad condition and crossing unpredictable checkpoints east of 
Jerusalem causing delay. The Jordan Valley is the most important Palestinian 
agricultural area today, but it is not allowed for Palestinians who are not from the 
area to enter unless they have a permit to work in the Valley. Moreover, the farmers 
face difficulties in moving their goods to the markets. These obstacles have 
contributed to raising the prices, causing unpredictability of trade and reducing the 
availability and quality of goods to the consumers (OCHAOPT, May, 2006). As has 
been reported by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA), movement from one locality to another in the West Bank was 
controlled by a network of 607 checkpoints in April 2008 as compared to 566 in 
September 2007 as shown in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: Number of closures within the West Bank 
Source: (OCHAOPT, April, 2008) 
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3.4.2 Movement between the Gaza strip and West Bank  
With limited movement of people due to the security regulations and the political 
situation, the economical and social activities between the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
have been affected. Moreover, the heavy security measures and the limitation on the 
movement of goods between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, have contributed to 
increase the delay and transaction costs, especially for goods that are entering the 
Gaza Strip. In addition to this, using a back to back system, where commercial goods 
must be off-loaded and then re-loaded onto another truck, has made the Palestinian 
products non-competitive compared with goods imported from Israel. Moreover, the 
absence of a physical geographical link between the two parts of the country has 
contributed to fragmentation of the local consumption market. Under AMA 2005 the 
different parties agreed on truck convoys between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
to pass through Israel under a security force, but it has not been implemented until 
now (PALTRADE & Peres Centre for Peace, Feb, 2007, p.20).  
3.4.3 Movement across the West Bank and Gaza to Israel and global market 
At the West Bank borders Israel enforces a back to back system with strict security 
measures causing delay and uncertainty with damage to the goods. As a result, these 
measures act as a non-tariff barrier to trade, which makes it difficult for Palestinian 
traders to import and export without Israeli middlemen and paying Israeli drivers 
during waiting time at the border crossing (PALTRADE & Peres Centre for Peace, 
Feb, 2007). Palestinian goods moved to and through Israel are subjected to 
substantial costs since the truck operating costs are high due to the use of the back to 
back system and the delay and the time the drivers have to wait at the border 
crossings. The cost associated with exporting a 12 ton truck or one container through 
Israeli gateways exceeds the costs of truck transport as shown in Table 2 (USAID & 
World Bank, December, 2004). 
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Table 2: Average transport cost for trucking 
 
Origin Port Transport Border crossing Total 
Ashdod $322 $589 $911 
West Bank 
Haifa $384 $588 $972 
Ashdod $161 $589 $750 
Haifa $345 $588 $933 Gaza 
Port Said $546 $438 $984 
Source: (USAID & World Bank, December, 2004) 
3.4.4 Access to the global market via third countries 
The trade with Jordan through the Allenby terminal shown in Figure 10 is subjected 
to Israel’s military and customs control. Moreover, the Israeli government is 
preventing the reconstruction of Gaza Airport after it had been completely destroyed 
in 2006, and also preventing the construction of the Gaza Seaport, which could 
provide an alternative to the Palestinian traders to access the global market. In 
addition, the Israeli customs union is preventing the handling of customs operations 
by the Palestinian Authorities. Furthermore, the Rafah corridor, which connects 
Egypt with the Palestinian side, has been agreed under AMA 2005 to be used as a 
trading terminal for the movement of goods between the Gaza strip and the global 
market. The Arab League agreement on the transit of goods approves a duty free 
transit of Palestinian goods through Egypt, but still, the corridor has not been used 
due to Israeli government security restrictions (PALTRADE & Peres Centre for 
Peace, Feb, 2007).  
3.5 Impact on trade 
The multiple obstacles and procedures facing the Palestinian traders contribute 
significantly to hampering the trade, with costs and unreliable logistics, which reduce 
their ability to compete in the international market. These factors can be summarised 
by the following: (USAID & World Bank, December, 2004) 
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1. Delays and uncertainty at the border crossings 
This factor contributes to reducing the opportunities for exports of time sensitive 
goods, where the transit time is unpredictable.  
2. Lack of flexibility in the routing of goods 
The shipper will not be able to find any alternatives to have the freedom to seek out 
the least cost alternative or reduce the risk associated with border closure. 
3. The need to use Israeli trucks in Israel  
The forced demand from the Israeli government to use Israeli trucks has allowed the 
providers of the service to charge high prices, which as a result put the Palestinians at 
a competitive disadvantage. 
4. Multiple inspections per shipment 
With the slow transit time and unpredictability the Palestinian shipper is faced with 
excessive time penalties and, moreover, cargo damage, reducing the profit margins. 
5. Limitations on the personal travel of Palestinian exporters 
 With this factor the Palestinian businessmen face limitations to travel and in 
consequence, need to use Israeli intermediaries, which limit the exporters’ 
opportunities to interact with customers outside the region. 
3.6 Palestinian economy and the impact of closure policy 
The economic development of the Palestinian territory is facing numerous challenges. 
As the World Bank wrote in December 2004, “While prosperity is no guarantee of 
tranquillity, history teaches that the opposite is true: that destitution, political 
instability and violence are constant companions”.  
Jim Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank 1995-2005 continually emphasized the 
need to create Palestinian economic momentum and its connection with Israel’s 
security. In 2005 he wrote to Prime Minister Sharon and President Mahmud Abbas; 
“I believe that we have an opportunity….to see a peaceful period where Palestinians 
can develop a better life based on tangible and visible prospects and where Israel can 
be more secure precisely because Palestinians….have greater freedom and hope” 
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(World Bank, December, 2005). The closure policy has affected the Palestinian 
economy in three main areas: 
− Movement of goods and services 
− Discouraging investment  
− Worker’s remittances 
Due to Israeli security measures and the closure policy, which is taking place since 
2000, Palestinians have suffered in different aspects such as travelling, movement of 
goods, and access to the international market. The isolation policy, which has been 
imposed on the Palestinian Authority, has squeezed the economic size. The 
Preliminary Palestinian Central Bureau of statistics (PCBS) shows that in 2006 the 
GNI declined by 15%, and estimated the decline in GDP to be 6.6%. Moreover, 
exports have declined by 3 percent while at the same time imports jumped by 20 per 
cent. This reflects the fact that the Palestinian market is isolated from the global 
markets, leaving a trade deficit of up to 73% of GDP (UNCTAD, 2007). The poverty 
level has reached 57.2 % of the households, which are below the national poverty 
line of 385$. In addition, the percentage of unemployed among the persons 
participating in the labour force in 2007 was 21.5% (PCBS, 2008). UNCTAD has 
reported a different and higher percentage of unemployed among the persons 
participating in the labour force; in 2006 it was 29.6%. 
After eight years of economic siege every sector in the Palestinian Authority has 
been affected. The agriculture sector declined from 1996 to 2006 by 19 per cent, and 
the manufacturing sector declined by 7 per cent during the same period. Moreover, 
the isolation policy resulted in reducing the exports to Israel and the rest of the world, 
which reflects the policy of isolation from the world and Arab markets. In 2006 the 
imports counted as % of the GDP, accounted for 86% compared to 75% in 2005. 
This change means 500$ million were lost to the economy. The reduction in GDP 
and increase in imports means that the collapse of demand can be attributed to 
Israel’s closure policy and the loss of local production to imports from Israel, which 
results in more than 55% of the Palestinian trade deficit; in other words, 50% of the 
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Palestinian GDP was needed to pay for the trade deficit with Israel (UNCTAD, 
2007).  
 
Table 3 : Palestinian economy (West Bank and Gaza Strip) Key indicators, selected 
years 
 
 Macroeconomic performance   1995 1999  2002 rev.  2003 rev.  2004 rev.  2005 prl. 2006 2007
 Real GDP growth (%)  6.1 8.6 -3.8 8.5 6.3   4.9  -6.6  0.7
 GDP (million $)  4 511 4 261 3 556  3 995 4 248   4 443  4 150 4135.8
 GNI (million $)  3 699 4 932 3 835  4 251 4 884   5 119  4 522 4629.8
 GNDI * (million $)  - - 4 455  4 640 4 842   5 441  5 421 5967.3
 GDP per capita ($)  1 380 1 478 1 146  1 221 1 264    1 258  1 134 1099.5
 GNI per capita ($)  1 583 1 736 1 215  1 298 1 441   1 452  1 236 1230.8
 Real GNI per capita growth (%)  7.9 4.1 -8.9 6.2 1.5   -1  -14.9 2.5
 Domestic expenditure (% of GDP)  151.8 163.0 145.8  150.2 150.7   154.5  173 
 Population and labour  
 Population (million)  2.34 2.84 3.16 3.27 3.39   3.53  3.66 3.762
 Unemployment (% of labour force)b 26.6 21.2 41.3 33.4 32.5   29.0  29.6 
 Total employment (thousand)  417 588 477 564 578   633  666 
  In public sector  51 103 115 119 131   145  164 
  In Israel and settlements  50 127 49 55 50   63  64 
 Fiscal balance (% of GDP)  
 Government revenue  13.2 23.8 8.2  19.1 20.5   27.7  13.9 11.6
 Current expenditure  15.3 22.5 27.6  31.4 32.0   43.6  31.9 25.86
 Total expenditure  25.5 29.8 28.2  32.3 32.8   44.9  33 
 Recurrent balance  -2.1 1.3 -19.4  -12.3 -11.5    15.9   18.0 
 Overall balance  -12.3 -6.0 -20.0  -13.2 -12.3   17.2  19.1 
 External trade  
 Exports of goods and services (million $)  499 684 420  433 482   665  581 
 Imports of goods and services (million $)  2 176 3 353 2 130  2 404 2 751   3 352  3 631 
 Trade balance (% of GDP)  -52.0 -63.6 -47.2  -49.3 -53   -60.4  -73 
 Trade balance with Israel (million $)  -1 388 -1 766 -1 149  -1 370 -1 623   -1 943  1 999 
 Trade balance with Israel (% of GDP)  -43.0 -42.0 -31.8  -34.3 -37.9   -43.7  48.2 
 Imports from Israel/PA private consumption (%)  56.5 54.5 43.6  43.4 44.6   51.5  43.5 
  Total PA trade with Israel/total Israeli trade (%)c 3.7 3.7 2.1  2.2 2.2   2.4  3.1 
 PA trade with Israel/total PA trade (%)c 78.8 68.0 69.0  69.1 70.3   70.1  66 
 Palestinian economy (West Bank and Gaza Strip) Key indicators, selected years
Source: (UNCTAD, 2007) 
 
In addition, Israeli Authorities are responsible for collecting the taxes on behalf of 
the Palestinian Authorities as agreed in the Oslo agreement, but in 2006 Israel 
withheld more than 800$ million from the Palestinian tax revenues. As a result, 
Palestinian revenues declined by more than 50% compared to 2005, leaving a budget 
deficit of 791$ million, i.e. 19 per cent of GDP, leaving a negative impact on the 
economy (UNCTAD, 2007). 
In this environment, private investors are unlikely to take the risk and invest. The 
uncertainty makes it less attractive for private investors to invest in the trade sector.  
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A study carried out by the United Nations–CEPAL to analyse the effect of 
uncertainty about the cost of transportation, leading to future cost rises which result 
in affecting the decision to invest, due to the fact that export costs will be high and 
also the imported raw materials which are needed to make the product. The study 
suggest that diversification of the trade through more than one transit country would 
offset the risk of uncertainty. The study has used a simple model to show this fact2  
(Carcamo Diaz, 2004). 
In summary, the Palestinian Authority transit regime is surrounded with uncertainty 
in the transportation cost and with high transportation costs. In addition to that, the 
investors are risk aversive due to the existing political environment and the conflict 
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The post Oslo agreement investments 
can be noticed from Figure 15 as being at exceptionally high levels reflecting an 
optimistic and high expectation of the peace process. To offset this risk and the effect 
of the isolation policy, the Palestinian Authority required establishing intensive 
trading programs with neighbouring countries to increase their market dimension. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Private investment - Percentage of GDP (1975 – 2005) 
Source: (UNCTAD, 2007) 
                                                 
2 For More information about the study please refer to the web site 
http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/8/14228/lcl2075i.pdf 
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3.7 Jordan Valley and Paris Protocol with the de facto trade regime 
The Palestinian economy is subjected to many restrictions that impede growth. The 
restrictions on the movement in the Jordan Valley and the unimplemented Paris 
Protocol have an impact on the growth creating a de facto trade regime. 
3.7.1 Jordan Valley coexistence problem 
The Jordan Valley is a critical valued area that serves the West Bank economy. The 
area is an important source of agriculture production and known among the 
Palestinians as the ‘bread basket’. Now the Jordan Valley is facing a political and 
security burden being implemented by the Israel government. 
Since October 2005 it became necessary to obtain a permit to pass through the 
checkpoints into the area, which is causing delays and obstacles to movement. 
According to the OCHA, there were 21 physical obstacles in the Jordan Valley in 
April 2007. 
Moreover, only the Palestinians with an address on their identification card 
indicating Jordan Valley are allowed to access the area. These security measures 
have as a result that the Palestinians who own land or property in the Jordan valley 
and live in some other place can no longer access their property without a permit. 
The permit even does not give the owner the right to stay overnight, which forces 
them to travel back and forth daily causing additional delay.  
Moreover, all trade from the Jordan valley has to be processed through the Jalameh 
terminal into Israel and en route to the Gaza Strip using the back to back system 
(Arnon & Bamya, November, 2007). 
3.7.2 Paris Protocol highlights 
The aim of the Paris Protocol3 is to be as a transitional tool which would guarantee 
that the new changes in the economic and regulatory relationship between the 
Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government would not harm the existing 
                                                 
3 The Paris Protocol was adopted between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Israeli 
government as Protocol IV of the Oslo agreement. 
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relationship. Moreover, the protocol gave the Palestinians some sovereignty in 
managing their internal markets. This protocol was intended to provide a basis for 
strengthening the Palestinian economy and diversifying its external trade partners, 
such as neighbouring Arab countries, by ensuring the free movement of goods and 
people. 
According to the Protocol the process of clearance of goods is handled by the Israeli 
customs on behalf of the Palestinian Authority and transferring the revenue to the 
Palestinian Authority, until the Palestinian customs have built their own capacity to 
be able to handle the customs operation.  
3.7.3 Paris protocol limitations  
Some of the limitations the protocol imposes on the Palestinian Authority are as 
follows: 
? The Palestinian Authority cannot offer trade partners preferential or duty-free 
treatment to imports from most countries which Israel does not have such an 
arrangement with. 
? The movement of goods between the Palestinian Authority and Israel is 
subjected to security measures, thereby restricting the movement of both 
Palestinian imports and exports through Israel. 
? The Protocol limits the Palestinian Authority’s ability to generate revenues 
since the possibility of the Palestinian Authority imposing a higher tariff rate 
(or indirect taxation) than Israel is constrained by the absence of provisions 
preventing the same goods from entering via Israel.  
? The implementation of a customs union leads to adoption of trade 
arrangements which were in Israel’s interest but not in the interest of the 
Palestinian economy. 
? The protocol does not ensure the Palestinian Authority receiving customs 
revenues on goods that are not of Israeli origin, but imported from other 
countries to the West Bank and Gaza Strip via Israel. Such a clause cost the 
Palestinian Authority EUR 129.6 million and EUR 214.7 million in 1996 and 
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1997 respectively. As a result the Palestinian Authority has increased its 
monitoring efforts and has been able to gradually capture fiscal revenues 
from actual imports (Euro Med, December, 2004). 
As has been discussed in the previous chapters, the limitations and the low operation 
level with the imposed closure policy on the main border crossings in the Gaza strip, 
at the Karni and the Rafah terminals have choked the economic activity. 
Moreover, The Israeli settlements in the West Bank limit the movement within the 
West Bank and the Israeli markets. Furthermore, restrictions to access the Jordan 
Valley for most Palestinians has limited the Palestinian investment, preventing it to 
benefit from this critical agricultural region. 
The current status quo and de facto trade regime in the Palestinian territory is 
inconsistent with the Paris Protocol. This has resulted in eliminating any potential for 
the free movement of goods and people. Consequently, the basic concept of the Paris 
Protocol has not been implemented and this can be attributed to the conflict and 
unbalanced bargaining position between the Palestinian National Authority and Israel. 
The reason behind the non-implementation of the agreement is that the framework of 
the agreement avoided the issues of sovereignty by creating a virtual concept of 
sovereignty, where the two societies will first coexist under the Israeli controlled 
external trades, without any internal borders and without a link between the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. Afterward, the process was meant to slowly continue toward 
the creation of the Palestinian state with a control over external trades and linking the 
West Bank with the Gaza Strip, but unfortunately this never happened (Arnon & 
Bamya, November, 2007). 
Therefore, a new agreement would greatly benefit the Palestinians by separating 
customs from Israeli control, thereby guaranteeing the market diversification and 
resulting in minimizing the dependence on the Israeli market as the only market. This 
would allow the Palestinians to import commodities at lower prices than those 
imported from Israel.  
Trade facilitation efforts to diversify the Palestinian trade and reduce the dependency 
on Israel should be the cornerstone of any initiative by the Palestinian Authority.  
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4 CHAPTER FOUR 
4 TRAFFIC ANALYSIS  IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 
The Palestinian territories have a large and rapidly growing population and as a result 
trade is also growing. The current status of the Palestinian borders and trade policy 
impedes any further development in trade growth. The projection of trade activities 
together with future demographic changes will influence the demand for 
transportation and trade facilitation and measure the benefits of transport facilities 
investment. 
The cargo traffic through the Palestinian territories will be forecasted on the basis of 
the present environment taking into consideration the economic and political 
conditions. The development of the trade activities covering the Gaza Strip and West 
Bank depends mainly on the economical and political environment. The sensitivity 
of the economic and political conditions in the region will influence the actual level 
of cargo traffic.  
4.1 Forecasting scenarios 
The absence of any progress in the political negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority could slow and shutdown any development. Accordingly, 
cargo traffic forecasts will be made for the high, medium, and low scenarios. The 
simplest method of traffic forecasting is to project from past trends, making whatever 
adjustments that may be necessary to take into consideration changes that are likely 
to modify these trends. 
4.1.1 High scenarios  
A good political relationship with Israel would allow development of trade between 
both countries with greater openness of the economy, development in value added 
services and high technological industry. As a result, the Palestinian economy would 
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become more competitive with a large improvement in productivity. In addition, 
there would be a reduction in the dependency on the public sector with increase in 
the private sector growth. Moreover, external trade and economic relationships with 
neighbouring Arab countries would increase, by rerouting trade and the 
establishment of the Gaza Seaport and airport. 
4.1.2 The medium scenario 
If the economic and political relationships with Israel are not so strong, then 
openness of the Palestinian economy will be restricted from being fully realized, 
leading to limited opportunities, especially in the investment of the private sector. 
This will still lead to a reduction in the dependency on the public sector, but it will 
still remain an important element in the economy. At the same time the economic 
relations with the neighbouring Arab countries will grow, but not be fully realized 
due to the restrictions.  
4.1.3 The low scenario 
The economic and political relationships with Israel are very poor, which create 
uncertainty with limited investments and lack of openness of the Palestinian 
economy, and the Palestinian entrepreneurs will have limited access to the Israeli 
economy. Also, external trade and economic relations with neighbouring Arab 
countries will grow but this growth will not achieve its full potential because of the 
internal restrictions on movement and the limitation on establishing the Gaza seaport 
and airport.  
4.2 Traffic forecast 
The main purpose of the traffic forecast analysis is to determine the demand for 
transportation and justify the investment in new infrastructures that enhance trade 
facilitations. 
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From the Palestinian Central Bureau of statistics (PCBS), historical data of exports, 
imports and GDP from 1998 to 2006 have been obtained and presented in Table 4. 
This historical data will be used to forecast the trend of exports and imports. 
 
Table 4: Main indicators in Palestine for the years 1998-2006 
Sources: (PCBS, 2007) and (PCBS, November, 2007) and (PCBS, November, 2006) 
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Figure 16: Total Trade – GDP 
Source: The Author 
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Figure 17: Import value – GDP 
Source: The Author 
Year GDP Import Export Net Balance Total Trade 
1998 $4,148 $2,375,102 $394,846 -$1,980,256 $2,769,948 
1999 $4,512 $3,007,228 $372,148 -$2,635,080 $3,379,376 
2000 $4,261 $2,382,807 $400,857 -$1,981,950 $2,783,664 
2001 $3,989 $2,033,647 $290,349 -$1,743,298 $2,323,996 
2002 $3,839 $1,515,608 $240,867 -$1,274,741 $1,756,475 
2003 $4,165 $1,800,268 $279,680 -$1,520,588 $2,079,948 
2004 $4,248 $2,393,267 $312,688 -$2,080,579 $2,705,955 
2005 $4,503 $2,666,773 $335,443 -$2,331,330 $3,002,216 
2006 $4,107 $2,835,000 $339,000 -$2,496,000 $3,174,000 
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The historical data show a strong and positive correlation between the GDP 
performance and the total trade value with an r value of 0.77. In other words, 77% of 
the increase in the total trade can be explained by the GDP growth, and 76% of the 
increase in the total import value can be explained by the GDP growth. Figures 16 
and 17 describe statistically the regression and the trend line for both the total trade 
and the total import. The regression analysis shows that forecasted Palestinian trade 
will be mainly influenced by the GDP.  
4.2.1 Projected GDP 
The World Bank and RAND cooperation have forecasted the Palestinian GDP, and 
based on both forecasts the USAID forecasted the GDP from 2005 to 2030 with an 
assumption of three scenarios: high growth scenario, medium growth scenario and 
low growth scenario.  As projected by USAID, Table 5 presents the projected GDP 
for 5 year intervals from 2005 to 2030. The average annual growths for the three 
scenarios are 8.69%, 7.54% and 5.25% for the high, medium and low growth 
scenarios respectively (USAID, March, 2006, p.24). 
 
Table 5: Projected Palestinian GDP from 2010 – 2025 
 
Year High Medium Low 
2,005 $3,620 $3,440 $3,369 
2,010 $5,556 $4,020 $3,542 
2,015 $9,992 $7,324 $5,554 
2,020 $13,984 $10,099 $7,067 
2,025 $19,152 $14,734 $9,382 
Annual Average growth 8.69% 7.54% 5.25% 
Source: (USAID, March, 2006)  
4.3 Forecasted traffic value 
This study will consider the projected GDP from 2010-2025 with the three different 
scenarios and apply it in the equation presented in Figures 16 and 17 as follows: 
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Total Import Value = (1687.5* GDP) – 5000000 ------------ (1) 
 
Total Trade Value = (1835* GDP) – 5000000 ---------------- (2) 
 
From equations 1 and 2, the forecasted imports and exports value and the total trade 
value are as illustrated in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Forecasted Total trade from 2010 – 2025 
 
Year GDP Imports Exports Total Trade 
High scenario 
2010 $5,556 $4,628,205.19 $529,974.78 $5,158,180 
2015 $9,992 $12,114,119.45 $1,184,097.40 $13,298,217 
2020 $13,984 $18,850,767.27 $1,772,748.78 $20,623,516 
2025 $19,152 $27,571,958.64 $2,534,810.49 $30,106,769 
Medium scenario 
2010 $4,020 $2,036,148.32 $303,479.66 $2,339,628 
2015 $7,324 $7,611,770.66 $790,680.10 $8,402,451 
2020 $10,099 $12,294,685.91 $1,199,875.38 $13,494,561 
2025 $14,734 $20,116,420.04 $1,883,342.10 $21,999,762 
Low scenario 
2010 $3,542 $1,229,505.62 $232,994.85 $1,462,500 
2015 $5,554 $4,624,830.12 $529,679.86 $5,154,510 
2020 $7,067 $7,178,073.64 $752,783.46 $7,930,857 
2025 $9,382 $11,084,721.86 $1,094,148.17 $12,178,870 
Source: The Author 
 
The forecasted trade figures are in $ value and to convert this into tons of cargo is a 
main challenge coming from the differences and changes of the value of the goods. 
Accordingly, the USAID report in March 2006, assumed 1.2 $/kg as an average 
value. This value will be assumed for the years from 1998-2007. Table 1 Appendix 
A shows that the total trade in 2007 was 2.502 million tons divided into 2.170 
million tons of imports and 331.17 thousand tons of exports. From the forecasted 
values of total trade, in the high growth scenario there is an annual average growth of 
imports by 12.39% from 2005 to 2025 and for exports of 10.64% for the same period 
with an average annual growth of the total trade of 11.52%. Moreover, in the 
medium growth scenario the growth in the imports was 10.63% and exports of 9.01%, 
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with an annual average growth rate for the total trade of 9.82%. In addition, the low 
growth scenario shows an annual growth rate of 7.38% and 6.09% for the imports 
and exports respectively, with an annual average growth for the total trade of 6.48% 
as shown in Table 2 of Appendix A. Moreover, the forecasted GDP by the USAID 
shows an annual average growth of 8.69%, 7.54% and 5.25% in the high, medium 
and low growth scenarios respectively as shown previously in Table 5. 
4.4 Volume forecast 
This study will use, based on the previous analysis to forecast the volume of trade 
from 2008 to 2025, an average annual growth rate for the different three scenarios as 
shown in Table 7. The forecasted volumes from 2008 to 2025 for the three scenarios 
shown in Figure 18 
 
Table 7: The assumed percentage for the different scenarios 
 
Scenario Percentage 
HIGH 10% 
Medium 9% 
LOW 6% 
Source: The Author 
 
Total Trade Forecast
0.00
2,000.00
4,000.00
6,000.00
8,000.00
10,000.00
12,000.00
14,000.00
16,000.00
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
20
19
20
20
20
21
20
22
20
23
20
24
20
25
Year
Vo
lu
m
e 
in
 (0
00
)T
on
High scenario
Medium Scenario
Low scenario
 
Figure 18: Forecasted volumes from 2008 to 2025 for the three scenarios 
Source: The Author 
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The forecasted volumes of trade from Table 3 in (Appendix A), show an increase in 
the volume from 2.502 million tons in 2007 to 13.91 million tons in 2025 and in the 
medium scenario an increase to 10.86 million tons and in the low scenario an 
increase to 7.14 million tons. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the Palestinian territories are faced with the 
closure policy and restricting security measures at the borders, causing high 
uncertainty, unreliability, and high total logistic costs. Thus, the exporters and 
importers have to face greater uncertainty with higher transportation cost due to the 
dependence on one transit country. In contrast, if in the future there is more than one 
transit country, the importers and exporters are less likely to have to pay higher 
logistic costs for transporting goods from the Palestinian territories, because the cost 
of transportation across the country will go down to competitive price levels. Thus, 
the larger the number of transit countries, the less the probability that higher costs 
will have to be paid for transportation (Carcamo Diaz, 2004). The problems that 
relate to the four factors of trade facilitation in the Palestinian territories are 
summarized in Figure 19. 
In this regard, it is necessary to have an understanding of the need for a new long 
term crossing regime that the Palestinian Authority has to consider to facilitate the 
trade and encourage investment in the Palestinian territories which is derived from 
the previous discussion. The border crossing should allow for: 
− Internal movement within the West Bank 
− Movement across the West Bank and Gaza Strip using Israeli borders, either 
to Israel or third countries via Israeli ports  
− Movement between the Gaza Strip and West Bank 
− Direct access to global markets either via Egypt and Jordan or via Seaport 
and Airport 
 
 
 45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Limitation on trade facilitation on the Palestinian territories 
Source: The Author 
Trade 
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limitation  
National and institutional policies and capacity 
• Unskilled Customs  
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• High transit cost  
• High transaction cost 
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Security 
• Dependence on the political relation 
• Closure policy 
• Multiple inspections per shipment 
• Limitation on personal movement 
 
Transport and communication infrastructure 
• Dependence on Israel as the only trading 
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• Inadequate border infrastructure  
• Communication technology not used 
• Lack of flexibility 
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To achieve an integrated crossing regime, the border crossing must be transformed 
from one directed by security only to a jointly managed system, with the security 
concerns as an integral part of the system, and a balance between security concerns 
and trade facilitation must be existing (PALTRADE & Peres Centre for Peace, Feb, 
2007, p.14).  
The study proposes alternative systems for smooth movement on the borders to 
develop a better trading environment with Israel and third countries, with the 
satisfaction of Israeli security concerns. Due to the present political conflict between 
the Palestinian government and the Israeli government, it is best to implement these 
developments gradually in stages. The different alternatives that can exist are the 
following: 
− Development of the border crossings with Israel to satisfy the condition of 
movement across the West Bank and Gaza Strip using Israeli borders, either 
to Israel or third countries via Israeli ports 
− Enhancing new trade routes with Egypt and Jordan through The Rafah 
terminal and Allenby terminal to satisfy the condition of direct access to the 
global markets 
− The construction of Gaza Seaport and Airport as the best option to satisfy the 
previous conditions 
− Connecting the West Bank and Gaza Strip ( the territorial link) to satisfy the 
condition of movement between the Gaza Strip and West Bank 
These alternatives will act as tools for the Palestinian economy to recover and to 
encourage the trade related investments especially with the forecasted traffic flow. 
There is an increase in the demand to facilitate the trade through expanding the 
transportation network, with more efficient use of information systems and more 
efficient customs clearance at the international borders. The next chapters will go 
into detail with the approaches required and have been divided into two stages, first 
stage the logistic solution during the interim period and the second stage the logistic 
solution for the future independent Palestinian state. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5 ECONOMIC APPROACHES FOR LOGISTIC SOLUTION DURING 
THE INTERIM PERIOD 
5.1 Border crossing approach 
The future of the Palestinian economy depends mainly on the enhancement of the 
trade logistics system, which permits a secure, reliable and competitive trading 
environment. The creation of a trade logistics system for the Gaza Strip and West 
Bank will be viable only by considering the main four movement obstacles discussed 
earlier (World Bank, June, 2005a). The current back to back system, which is 
implemented by the Israeli government aims to ensure full security inspection 
manually by unloading the goods and then loading them again in Israeli trucks as 
shown in Figure 20. From a commercial point of view, the back to back system 
causes problems such as: 
− Extra handling costs, delays and damages to goods 
− Uncertainty in the delivery of exports 
− Just in time not considered 
− Excessive trucking charges 
 
 
Figure 20: Back to Back system 
Source: (PALTRADE & Peres Centre for Peace, Feb, 2007) 
 
There are many different modern, efficient and secure alternatives, which have been 
implemented worldwide, such as tractor exchange system, securing the contents of 
the container using new technology and many other different approaches. All these 
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alternatives include the use of scanning and layered inspection (World Bank, June, 
2005a).  The back to back system must be changed, and this change can be done 
gradually, to develop trust and a secure trade environment. The system must be 
divided into phases; the first phase being a container transfer system using a scanner 
on the Palestinian side with an agreed procedure with the Israeli side. The following 
procedures should be followed: 
− The truck will enter the gate according to previous appointment  
− The documents will be checked at the gate, including the driver documents 
− The truck will then proceed to the scanner row, with a monitor at both sides 
to evaluate the risk and the content of the container 
− If the scanned result is clear, then the truck will be changed to an Israeli truck 
and continues to the Israeli side  
After that, on the Israeli side, the procedure will be done again as follows: 
− Document check 
− Loaded containers will be scanned again for more a detailed scan and 
evaluation 
− Empty containers will be directed to the exit gate 
− In the case of unclear container content the truck will be directed to the 
inspection department for physical check 
Figure 21 shows the procedures to achieve a container transfer system, which 
addresses the security concerns of the Israeli government and avoids the back to back 
system, enhancing the trade environment. Moreover, by expanding the number of 
working hours to 16 hours, the capacity of the terminal can reach 275 loaded trucks 
per day (World Bank, August, 2005). 
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Figure 21: Container Transfer System 
Source: (World Bank, August, 2005), (PALTRADE & Peres Centre for Peace, Feb, 2007), Author 
 
The second phase is the tractor exchange system, where inbound containers will be 
differentiated from outbound containers in the procedures of inspection and 
clearance. 
The inbound containers will be classified as containers imported from the Ashdod or 
Haifa ports, and containers shipped from the Gaza Strip/West Bank or Israel. 
Similarly, outbound containers are classified as containers exported from the Gaza 
Strip/West Bank to Israeli ports, and containers for cargo to Israel or Gaza 
Strip/West Bank as shown in Figure 22. When the normalized trade environment is 
achieved the number of scans should be reduced. 
The clearance procedures, which would be implemented, are as follows: 
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− Truck arrives at the terminal by previous appointment with all detailed data 
provided (truck number, type of cargo, driver name, destination…..etc.) 
− The truck will cross the border through a scanning system 
− The tractor will be changed to an Israeli tractor 
With consideration of that, inbound containers that have already been inspected in 
the Ashdod/Haifa ports or at another crossing point are provided with a seal and after 
checking the seal should proceed without any further inspection to the border 
crossing at which the change of tractor will take place. Similarly, outbound 
containers that are inspected at the terminal crossing and moving to Israeli ports 
should be sealed at the crossing point and proceed to the ports without any further 
inspections (World Bank, June, 2005b). Similarly, the reefer containers will follow 
the same procedures with high priority at the border crossing, and the liquid bulk 
cargo can be transferred with pipes and stored in a tank near the border crossing.  
 
The implementation of these two phases will automatically allow the possibility to 
create the third phase that is the through traffic approach as shown in Figure 23. But 
it is necessary to combine these phases with management and operational reforms to 
enhance the reliability and efficiency of operation. Palestinian and Israeli 
coordination to implement these phases is required with setting standards of 
management procedures and a risk management system. These management 
procedures must be implemented at all border crossing points on the Gaza Strip and 
the West Bank.  
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Figure 22: Tractor Exchange System 
Source: (World Bank, August, 2005), (PALTRADE & Peres Centre for Peace, Feb, 2007), Author 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Through Traffic Approach 
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5.1.1 Risk management and security 
Risk management and security is a main method to address the security concerns of 
the Israeli government and the needs to facilitate trade. The introduction of a risk 
management system could be the best approach, where it is adopted worldwide and 
has been stipulated by the World Customs Organization (WCO). The system can be 
one of the main elements that guarantee commercial facilitation with sound security 
to enable a reliable and secure supply chain. This can be achieved by: (PALTRADE 
& Peres Centre for Peace, Feb, 2007) 
− Separation of the cargo by type 
− A layered inspection regime in which the inspection procedures are 
differentiated according to the risk associated with the type of cargo 
− Information in advance that allows the data to be fed into the system and 
stipulates the level of inspection. The data provided should include all 
elements about the cargo destination and source, vehicle, driver and owner of 
the cargo. 
− The introduction of new technology with inspection 
5.1.2 Management and operations strategy 
An operations strategy consists of a sequence of decisions that, over time, enables the 
border to achieve a desired operations structure, infrastructure, and set of specific 
capabilities in support of the competitive priorities. This strategy encourages a 
responsible and sound management environment (PALTRADE & Peres Centre for 
Peace, Feb, 2007). Setting up a management and operations strategy will enhance the 
different key areas to be improved such as: 
− Responsibility, accountability and transparency 
− Coordination and communication 
− Third party participation 
− Management team to settle disputes and commercial recourse 
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5.1.3 Re-routing Palestinian trade 
The development of the Palestinian economy is subjected to the Israeli internal and 
external movement restrictions, but overcoming these restrictions is not enough for 
the Palestinian economy to recover unless it is supported by a new trade regime that 
enables the Palestinian Authority to be less dependent on Israeli policy. This 
isolation with Israeli control of the main borders creates the landlocked status owing 
to the absence of a seaport, not to the absence of a costal front. UNCTAD studies in 
2004 and 2007 suggested rerouting Palestinian trade. In this regard the rerouting of 
trade should be considered as the second best option until the construction of Gaza 
Seaport (UNCTAD, 2004 & 2007). 
At present, the main trade route is through Israel with a complete dependence on 
Israeli ports facilities. Since 2000 the complex Israeli security measures and the 
increase of checking points have increased the logistic cost with more transaction 
cost. This increase has resulted in eroding the competitive advantage of the 
Palestinian exports, which can be considered as a trade barrier. In 2003 the 
transaction costs associated with imports from Jordan were estimated at 494$ per 
shipment and the transaction costs from Egypt were estimated at 550$ per shipment 
and the costs of exporting from Gaza to Jordan were estimated at 630$ per shipment.  
 
Table 8: Occupied Palestinian territories’ main trade partners by value of trade, 2005  
(Millions of $) 
 
Region Imports Exports Total Trade 
 $ % $ % $ %
Israel  2333  92  413  91  2 746  92 
Jordan  40  2  16  4  56  2 
Egypt  28  1  0.1  0  28  1 
Remaining Arab countries  1  0.0  3  1  4  0.1 
Europe  69  3  15  3  84  3 
Asia, excl. Arab countries  45  2  5  1  50  2 
American countries  9  0.3  5  1  14  0.5 
Total trade: main partners  2524  100  457  100 2980  100 
Grand Total 3352 665 4017 
Source: (UNCTAD, 2007) 
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From Table 8 it can be seen that Israel was the main trading partner with 92% of the 
total value of trade, and the second was Jordan, which accounted for 2% of the 
Palestinian trade (UNCTAD, 2007). The rerouting of the Palestinian trade needs to 
balance the economic relations with Israel for the benefit of Palestinian shippers.   
5.1.4 Cost of rerouting trade 
A cost benefit analysis has been applied to study the impact of using Egyptian ports 
as an alternative for Gaza trade and using Aqaba Port in Jordan for West Bank trade. 
These costs include maritime transport, ports and different aspects of costs plus land 
transport and border crossings. Table 9 shows that the total annual cost of rerouting 
the trade estimated to be almost 35$ million, whereof 23.4$ million for imports and 
11.3$ million for exports. This is equivalent to $10 per ton on average, $8.8 per ton 
for imports and $20.6 per ton for exports. One of the main challenges facing the 
rerouting is the significant share of land transportation. In this situation development 
of land infrastructures and road network is required to reduce the transport cost. By a 
20% reduction in the transport cost the annual cost would be reduced by 19$ million. 
Furthermore, a 50% reduction in container cost by using the Suez Canal Container 
Terminal (SCCT) would generate 22$ million additional savings, and if Palestine 
rerouted the indirect imports through Israel, this would result in savings of 38$ 
million by the assumption of a 20% reduction on land transport, and 44$ million with 
a reduction of 50% in container costs. 
 
Table 9: Estimated annual cost of re-routing in million $ 
 
I m p o r t s E x p o r t s Type of shipment 
Gaza West Bank Gaza West Bank 
Total 
General cargo  4.71 9.25 0.40 7.66 22.02 
Containers  4.88 1.85 0.23 0.79 7.75 
Dry bulk  0.44 1.42 0.05 0.99 2.90 
Liquid bulk  -0.23 1.04 0.04 1.11 1.95 
Total  9.80 13.55 0.71 10.54 34.61 
Source: (UNCTAD, 2003).  
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Egyptian ports are showing competitive trade logistics in terms of time, cost and 
quality of services compared to those in Israel; moreover, Cairo airport is providing 
competitive rates to the Palestinian shipments on passenger air craft, allowing 
Palestinian exporters and importers to access the global market. To achieve benefits 
from rerouting the trade, national and regional effort is needed to develop the 
physical infrastructure with improvement of the transit procedures (UNCTAD, 2007).  
The development of this trade route will provide both long and short term benefits to 
the Egyptian economy and in the short term there will be more demand for trucking 
and logistic services.  
5.1.5 Rafah corridor development 
The World Bank suggested in it is latest study the development of the Rafah corridor, 
which will mainly concentrate on quick clearance, reliability and low cost to transfer 
the goods, by using more alternative routes with the Egyptian gateways as shown in 
Figure 24, the access routes using road mode have been marked with red and the sea 
mode marked with blue colour. 
− To Egypt’s ports at the Suez Canal 
− To Cairo airport 
− To Al-Arish airport 
− To Gulf of Aqaba to access the Gulf states 
 
Figure 24: Alternative routes with Egyptian gateway 
Source: (World-Bank, March, 2007) 
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The roads from Rafah to Cairo provide a good transport link with an adequate 
physical infrastructure and the same is the case with the road to the Suez Canal 
terminal. Moreover, the distance to the ports is relatively short whereby goods can be 
delivered within the same day. Table 10 shows the distance from the Rafah corridor 
to different destination ports (World Bank, March, 2007). 
 
Table 10: Indicative Road distances and Times from Rafah Border Crossing 
 
  Port (SCCT) 
Airport 
(Cairo Intl) Nuweiba To UAE Ashdod
Distance (km) 235 355 350 (approx.) 
3000 
(approx.) 40 
Approx time 
(hrs.) 3-4 6-8 5-6 4-5 (days) 1-2 
Source: (World Bank, March, 2007) 
 
Furthermore, it is important to analyze the competitive alternative, not based on 
distance only, but to look in terms of costs, reliability and time required to meet the 
demands. The distance to Ashdod Port is approximately 40Km from the Karni 
crossing point, whereas SCCT is around 235Km away through the Rafah corridor. In 
terms of cost, considering the formal payment at the Karni crossing (informal 
payments range between USD 2000-USD 6000) in order to seek a comparison, the 
cost shows Egyptian trucking is likely to be equivalent. This is due to the lower cost 
of trucking in Egypt and the cheap labour cost as stated in Table 11 (World Bank, 
March, 2007). 
 
Table 11:  Indicative Freight Rates-Road Transport 
 
Route Rafah - Cairo Airport Rafah-East/West Said Karni - Ashdod 
Vehicle Refrigerated Truck Marine Container Fixed Axle 
Cargo 5 – 10 Tons 40’ (2 – 20’) 40’ (2 – 20’) 
Rate (USD) $500 / Truck $450 $450 
Source: (World Bank, March, 2007) 
 
In addition, Cairo airport provides competitive rates in comparison with Ben gurion 
airport in Israel, from which shipment with passenger aircraft is not allowed for 
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Palestinians. Moreover, Cairo airport offers direct services to Gulf markets with a 
shorter time for products that are sensitive to time. In contrast, for products that are 
less time sensitive, SCCT and land transport are very competitive options in terms of 
cost and reliability. 
 
Table 12: Air Freight Comparability 
 
USD/kg Ben gurion Cairo Intl 
London $1.18 - $1.22 $1.25-1.40 
Dubai n/a $1.50-1.70 
Singapore $1.75 - $2.00 $1.75-2.20 
Source: (World Bank, March, 2007) 
 
Table 13:  Sea Freight Rates 
 
  SCCT – Port Said Haifa / Ashdod 
Singapore   
Time (days) 9-12 14-15 
Rate USD/TEU $535 $515 
Rotterdam   
Time (days) 9 9 
Rate USD/TEU $670 $802 
Jebel Ali 
(Dubai)   
Time (days) 3-4 6-8 
Rate USD/TEU $970 $1,126 
Source: (World Bank, March, 2007) 
 
In summary, using the Rafah corridor offers a competitive alternative to the 
Palestinian trades in terms of air services and sea freight. From Tables 12 and 13 it 
can be seen that the Rafah corridor offers a faster time to Asia, less expensive and 
faster time to the Gulf and equivalent time and lower cost to Europe (World Bank, 
March, 2007). 
In order to make the Rafah corridor a viable fact, it is necessary to address the 
security concerns of both the Israeli and Egyptian governments. 
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The main policy dominating the border crossings by Israel is concerned with the 
security with very low consideration for trade logistic and efficiency. The security 
regulations and measures do not consider the Palestinian exporters’ needs to deliver 
the goods in time agreed upon, and to be competitive in the market.   
Unquestionably, the links between trade and security have not been established. To 
be able to enjoy reliable access to Israel and global markets, a systematic rethinking 
is necessary to find the balance between both security needs and trade facilitation, 
which can be achieved through the design of the crossing facilities, using new 
technology and new procedures, which satisfy both the security concerns and the 
trade flow (USAID & World Bank, December, 2004). 
5.2 Gaza commercial seaport 
Gaza Seaport would be a cornerstone for economic development of Palestine. The 
construction of Gaza Seaport by the Palestinian Authority would enable direct access 
to the market, and as a result would be the growth engine of the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank economy to expand, diversify foreign trade and growth in the external 
trade oriented industries. These would in turn enable growth in domestic output and 
incomes and, even more importantly, create new employment opportunities, beside 
the important benefit that can be gained from the lower transportation costs for the 
Palestinian imports and exports.  
The Gaza Seaport would encourage private sector activities, a free market economy, 
and regional and international trade links, while providing thousands of direct and 
indirect job opportunities. A direct trade outlet would reinforce investor confidence 
in Palestine and help attract investments to generate employment in diverse 
economic sectors. At present the imports and exports requirements of the Palestine 
are almost solely supplied through Israel and the port of Ashdod in Israel, which in 
the context leads to delays and extra costs for the Palestinian economy. For that 
reason, the Palestinian National Authority intends to secure an economic supply 
chain for Palestine and to meet the critical needs of the Palestinian economy in order 
to liberate it from the restrictions imposed on imports and exports. Moreover, the 
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Gaza Seaport would remove the Palestinian economy from the landlocked position. 
The traffic through the future Gaza port from the forecasting analysis in the previous 
chapter will be assumed to be 70% of the total traffic, and then this total volume of 
trade will be broken down by cargo type. The technical and economical study of the 
port undertaken by the Palestinian Authority in 1996 divided cargos into three 
categories: miscellaneous cargo, dry bulk, and oil bulk. Table 14 shows the break 
down by cargo type for the years of operation with an interval of 5 years. 
 
Table 14: Percentage changes for the operation years 
 
Percentage Year1 Year6 Year11 Year16 Year21 
Miscellaneous cargo 46.1% 40.8% 40.8% 40.8% 40.8% 
Dry Bulk 34.3% 29.6% 29.6% 29.6% 29.6% 
Oil Bulk 19.5% 29.6% 29.6% 29.6% 29.6% 
 Source: (Palestinian Authority, 1996) 
 
Accordingly, the forecasted traffic volume is presented in Table 4 (Appendix A) for 
the three scenarios. This will show an increase in traffic from 1.926, 1.900 and 1.856, 
in 2008 to reach to 9.737, 7.605 and 4.999 million tons in 2025 for the high, medium 
and low growth scenarios respectively, as shown in Table 5 (Appendix A). This 
increase in traffic shows the necessity and the urgent need for developing the Gaza 
seaport for the Palestinian territories to be able to expand the local and regional 
markets. In 1995, when the port studies were done, this volume of traffic was not 
expected, so in this regard this will have an implication on the design of the port and 
the phases that it will be constructed by. 
It is critical to develop the Gaza seaport in a way that is consistent with the future 
logistics requirements of the state of Palestine, but as a result of the current political 
circumstances these will not be known for some time. With a closed border scenario 
and a reliable and efficient corridor connecting the West Bank with Gaza, the Gaza 
seaport would be required to handle all the West Bank and Gaza cargo (Shaat, 2003) 
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5.3 Linking the Gaza Strip with the West Bank (The territorial link) 
Both Gaza and the West Bank are integral parts of the Palestinian economy, so 
achieving economic recovery can be viable only with an unhampered flow of goods 
and people between these two regions. Moreover, the viability of the construction of 
the Gaza Seaport would depend mainly on this flow. A well functioning link would 
create an effective market enhancing an effective use of production factors such as 
labour (USAID & World Bank, December, 2004, p.13). The link between the two 
regions should provide flexible and low transportation cost, which could improve the 
competitiveness of the Palestinian products. Moreover, the implementation of the 
West Bank/Gaza Strip link would have a positive impact on the Palestinian economy 
and society. Thus, this could induce an increase of the outputs by the regional 
industries due to the reduction in the transportation cost, more certainty and 
reliability, which would allow the industries to increase the production capacity to 
expand markets that were not accessible before. With reducing inventory cost the 
prices will be reduced and result in increasing the levels of consumption. Figure 25 
shows the proposed link between the Gaza Strip and West Bank as had been 
suggested in a study carried on by the USAID, published in March 2006. 
The study was undertaken with the purpose of examining and determining the most 
economical and rational options for transport linkages between the Gaza Strip and 
the West Bank. The study considers 10 different transport alignments connecting the 
West Bank to the Gaza Strip along with a number of multiple combinations: road 
only, rail only and road and rail within the same corridor. It is very important to 
identify the locations of each of the proposed terminals in the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank. 
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Figure 25: The proposed alternatives for the link between the Gaza Strip and West Bank 
Source: (USAID, March, 2006) 
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5.3.1 Gaza end/start point 
The link should be at a point located at a suitable site in the Palestinian territories, 
considering the future planned deep water access by the seaport and a direct 
connection to the airport. The first proposed point is located in the north-eastern part 
of the Gaza Strip at point A in Figure 25, where the second point is located near the 
seaport at Salah Eldeen Road, south of Gaza city indicated in Figure 25 by B. The 
terminal point would logically be near the north- eastern part of the Gaza, which 
reduces the length of the link, but the other terminal point would provide congestion 
free access to the major traffic generators i.e. the Seaport, Airport and Gaza City 
(USAID, March, 2006, p.43). 
5.3.2 West Bank end/start point 
On the West Bank side, the study proposed two alternatives at Tarqumia and Meitar, 
points C and D, respectively. Proposing the location of these two terminals was 
definable from an engineering point of view, where the topography was a major 
constraint of the West Bank. To provide the best land topography with a shortest 
distance a connection to Tarqumia would be the best for the terminal utilization. The 
alignment allows a direct access to the neighbouring towns of Hebron. The land 
toward Hebron rises steeply and will require a significant investment to restructure it. 
The other possibility is to head south toward Meitar (indicated by point D). The 
distance associated with each alternative mode of transport shown in Table 15.  
 
In order to evaluate the alternatives and mode of transportation the time costs are 
important. The time that it can take to complete a trip by train divided into the time 
spent at the terminal and the travel time is shown in Table 16. 
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Table 15: Transport modes and distance in Km 
 
Transport mode Israel West Bank Gaza Total 
Road 42 1.4 0.6 44 
Rail 42 0.7 0.6 43.3 
Rail / Road 42 1.4 0.6 44 
Source: (USAID, March, 2006). 
 
Table 16: Railway Crossing Time 
 
 Passenger Freight Vehicles 
All options About 1 hour About 2 hours and 45 min 
Source: (USAID, March, 2006). 
 
Using the road mode, the time is divided regarding the type and characteristic of the 
vehicle and with the assumption that the average speed for cars is 110km/h, 100km/h 
for large buses, 90km/h for medium sized trucks and 80km/h for heavy trucks, then 
the time required to complete the trip using the road mode is shown in Table 17. 
  
Table 17: Time required completing the trip using road mode 
 
 Cars Large Buses Medium Trucks Heavy Trucks 
All options 24 min 27 min 30 min 33 min 
Source: (USAID, March, 2006). 
 
This shows that a road connection can be faster, but the assumption of rail transport 
still presents a viable choice. The security concerns of the Israeli government will 
influence the choice. In this regard the Palestinian Authority should think ahead and 
implement new negotiated agreements with Israel to enhance multimodal transport 
systems, which will be viable by implementing the previous suggestions regarding 
border crossing inspections, risk management and security and operations 
management and procedures. 
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6 CHAPTER SIX 
6 MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT TO ACHIEVE TRADE FACILITATION 
ON THE FUTURE INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE 
 
Today the traditional transport services are not enough to increase the degree of 
participation in the global economy. What are required now are complete logistic 
services, including the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) 
and multimodal transport (MT) operations. Multimodal Transport is the 
transportation of goods across international borders through at least two different 
transport modes and under a single Multimodal Transport Document (MTD), issued 
by a Multimodal Transport Operator (MTO). The main aim of Multimodal Transport 
is streamlining procedures and documents in order to link the various modes of 
transport and to facilitate the movement of goods by reducing the total cost of 
transport through increased efficiency under the single responsibility of the MTOs 
(UNCTAD, 2001). 
The expansions of the global trade and the way goods are manufactured have 
contributed greatly to the logistic revolution. The trends like Just in Time (JIT), 
global sourcing, outsourcing and shorter product market cycles have created a global 
conveyor belt. The growth increase of these systems and reducing the inventory 
stock allow companies to reduce their total logistic costs, which as a result have 
profound implications for the integration in the international economy. The 
sensitivity of supply chains to transport related disruptions and access to transport 
services, are key determinants for the competitiveness of individual firms and entire 
countries (D. Muller & Jentsch, August, 2002). 
To enhance the efficiency of hinterland connections for ports and airports, and 
smooth flows of goods, the network of roads and railroads must be considered as a 
priority. By definition, maritime and air transport can only deliver goods and 
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passengers between ports and airports, but to provide the door-to-door service that 
customers demand, effective integration with land-based modes is needed. 
In fact, land-border transport is a major source of disruptions, and because of that, 
streamlining of procedures, adequate staffing and physical facilities, a harmonization 
of standards for equipment and personnel would be desirable from an economic point 
of view (Muller & Jentsch, August, 2002). There is a strong connection between 
trade facilitation and multimodal transportation in the Palestinian territories. The 
Palestinian Authority should rethink the currently applied trade policy and encourage 
multimodal transport to achieve lower transaction cost and create reliable trade 
logistic solutions. The new trade policy would help the Palestinian economy to 
recover and reduce the dependency on Israel as the main trade partner when moving 
toward the independent state of Palestine. The proposed MT is intended to foster the 
movement of goods to and from the airport, seaport and the main international border 
crossings. These issues are addressed below. 
6.1 Roads/Railway 
It is important to take into consideration the fact that currently road transport is the 
only operational form of transport available in the Palestinian Territories, after the 
destruction of the Gaza Airport and the stopped Gaza Seaport project. The border 
crossing facilities and procedures put in place by the Israeli government, which are 
mainly focused on security aspects, with an extensive closure policy and check 
points, have resulted in constraints and hinder the movement of goods and people. 
The uncertainty at border crossings increases the transit time and reduces the 
opportunities of export and also creates costly and unreliable trade logistics (Euro 
Med, December, 2004). The road network in the future Palestinian independent state 
should be giving more consideration to establishing an integrated transport system. 
The study proposes a new system that would provide access to the main 
neighbouring country’s economical hubs such as Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, 
Haifa and Tel Aviv. In addition, it would provide access to the rest of the world 
through direct shipping and flight connections as shown in Figure 26.  
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In order to integrate these modes into a regional multimodal transport system, many 
improvements need to take place. Therefore, the launch of the Euro Mediterranean 
project4 is an important point. Similarly, the integrated transport system in Arab 
Mashrek by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western 
Africa (ESCWA) 5  demonstrate another effort to enhance a regional multimodal 
transport system. As shown in Figure 26, the main economic hubs in the West Bank 
would be Hebron connecting Israel, Jordan and the Gaza Strip, and Jenin would act 
as economical hub for connecting Lebanon, Syria and Israel.  
Similarly, the Gaza Strip would have two economical hubs at the seaport and airport 
connecting with the West Bank via the territorial link and to Egypt via the Rafah 
border and the rest of the world via shipping and air flights. 
With an assumption of a heavy truck speed of 80Km/h and USD 2.5 charges per Km 
Table 18 shows the cost of road transportation between the domestic economical 
hubs. It shows the cost per Km and the distance between them and also shows the 
time required to deliver a container. 
 
Table 18: The approximate Road/Rail distance between the domestic economical 
hubs and the cost 
From To Distance (Km) 
Charge 
Per Km 
($) 
Days 
Rail 
Days 
Road 
Total 
charges 
$ 
Gaza Seaport Gaza Airport 33 2.5 0.10 0.02 82.5 
Gaza Airport Hebron 102 2.5 0.14 0.05 255 
Gaza Seaport Hebron 69 2.5 0.12 0.04 172.5 
Hebron Jenin 120 2.5 0.15 0.06 300 
Source: The Author 
 
 
                                                 
4  The Euro Mediterranean Declaration was agreed upon by the EU, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, 
Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey and Israel and comprises establishing a free 
trade area and economic integration  
 
5  UN-ESCWA promotes economic and social development through regional and sub regional 
cooperation and integration and serves as the main general economic and social development forum 
within the United Nations system for the UN-ESCWA region 
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Figure 26: Proposed Multimodal transport operation in the Palestinian Territory 
 
Source: (Suisman, Simon, Robinson, Anthony, & Schoenbaum, 2007), the Author 
Jenin 
Hebron 
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At present no railway network exists in the Palestinian Territory but the multimodal 
transport system, especially for the territorial link between the Gaza Strip and West 
Bank suggests construction of a railway network in parallel with the road.  Railways 
cannot provide door to door service, but they have a cost advantage for long haul 
traffic.  The main objective of the link is to provide reliable and high speed rail 
services between the main cities in the West Bank and also to the airport and seaport.  
In the calculation we assumed 2 hours for documentation and loading and unloading 
the goods from the train at the departure and arrival terminals and with 80km/h 
travelling speed, the distance will take the time shown in Table 18. 
On the other hand, the multimodal transport system would connect the Palestinian 
state’s economical hubs with other neighbouring countries’ economical hubs via road 
as shown in Table 19. This shows a different picture including not only the 
transportation cost but also border crossings, which have an implication to increase 
the cost and time required for shipment. The border crossing charges have been 
derived from UNCTAD studies as shown in Table 20. 
 
Table 19: Domestic hubs to international hubs 
 
From To 
Distance 
(Km) 
approx. 
Charge 
Per Km 
($) 
Total 
transport 
charge 
Days 
to 
travel 
Time 
to 
cross 
border 
Total 
time to 
deliver 
Charges 
to cross 
border 
Hebron Amman 100 2.5 250 0.05 1 1.05 360 
Hebron Aqaba 373 2.5 932.5 0.19 1 1.19 360 
Hebron Tel Aviv 67 2.5 167.5 0.03 0.5 0.53 466 
Jenin Beirut 160 2.5 400 0.08 3 3.08 466 
Jenin Haifa 48 2.5 120 0.03 0.5 0.53 466 
Jenin Damascus 165 2.5 412.5 0.09 3 3.09 466 
Rafah Cairo 355 2.5 887.5 0.18 1 1.18 250 
Source: the Author 
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Table 20: Border crossing charges in $ 
 
No. Item Israel Egypt Jordan 
1 Custom clearance 120 125 140 
2 Loading and unloading 80 36 80 
3 Security check 236 36 105 
4 Coordination fees 30 0 0 
5 Passage fees 0 40 33 
6 Others 0 13 2 
  Total 466 250 360 
Source: (UNCTAD, 2004) 
6.2 Seaport 
The Seaport would be the key intermodal node and entry point for trade to the 
Palestinian Territories. The port is still in the planning stages and located in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. The seaport would be an essential part in the development of 
the Palestinian state in regard of identity and economy. The cargo would dominate 
more than passengers in the planned Gaza seaport and at the beginning imports 
would dominate but with developing industries, which mainly depend on a reliable 
shipping network, investment would be encouraged. This change would foster the 
development in the exports sector.  The seaport should be integrated with rail/road 
networks to reduce the time and transactions cost and enable door to door services. 
 
Table 21: Distance between main Eastern Mediterranean ports and Gaza Seaport and 
the number of days at sea 
 
Port Distance 
(nm) 
Days 
at Sea 
Dwell 
time 
At 
port 
Ocean 
Freight 
rate/(nm
) 
Total 
Ocean 
charge 
Port 
charges 
per FEU 
Total 
Charge 
Gioia Tauro 1008 1.75 5 0.44 443.52 100 543.52 
Port Said 85 0.15 5 0.44 37.40 100 137.40 
Malta Free 
port 
992 1.72 5 0.44 436.48 100 536.48 
Piraeus 624 1.08 5 0.44 274.56 100 374.56 
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Limassol 158 0.27 5 0.44 69.52 100 169.52 
Taranto 963 1.67 5 0.44 423.72 100 523.72 
Beirut 173 0.30 5 0.44 76.12 100 176.12 
Tortuous 236 0.41 5 0.44 103.84 100 203.84 
Haifa 105 0.18 5 0.44 46.20 100 146.20 
Source: Author, (Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay, 2007),http://www.youship.com/search/index.cfm 
 
The port will be able to establish connections with the main ports in the eastern 
Mediterranean as shown in Figure 27. The distance between the Gaza seaport and the 
main ports in the eastern Mediterranean are shown in Table 21. The Table shows the 
ocean freight rate per container as USD 0.44 per nautical mile which was obtained 
from the Maersk website.6 In addition, the number of days at sea was calculated by 
assuming that the average speed of a container ship is 24 knots, the dwelling time at 
port is 5 days and the port charges per FEU would be 100 USD.  
Based on the evaluation of the other ports in the region and their expansion plans it is 
concluded that Gaza port would be serving the local market of the Palestinian 
territories and as a transit port for regional cargo. The degree of competition amongst 
the major ports for container transhipment in the region makes it unrealistic to expect 
a transhipment role for Gaza port (Appendix C) 
The port would act as a feeder port connecting the Palestinian state with the 
European market via different ports in the eastern Mediterranean basin and to the 
Asian market via Egypt using Port Said Port or SCCT. The total cost for a container 
and the number of days expected to deliver the container are shown in Table 1 
(Appendix B).   
                                                 
6 The number was obtained from the website http://www.youship.com/search/index.cfm for container 
from Hong Kong to Taranto, Italy. The container cost USD 3250 carried over a distance of 7337 nm. 
The freight rate is considered to be high because it includes the Suez Canal transit due. 
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Figure 27: Gaza seaport with the main ports in the Mediterranean basin 
Source: Author, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/mediterranean_rel82.jpg
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6.3 Airport 
To build the economy of the future Palestinian state, an international airport is of a 
critical importance to have access to the rest of the world. The current Gaza airport is 
located near Rafah in Gaza. The Airport is located approximately 35Km from Gaza 
city and the distance to Jenin in the West Bank is approximately 220Km. Other 
distances between main locations in the Palestinian Territories are shown in Table 22. 
The airport location has a disadvantage. The disadvantage is that the West Bank is 
larger than the Gaza Strip in area which means more Palestinians are living and will 
live in the West Bank. This makes the airport which would serve them somewhat 
remote, but this location is due to security reasons implemented by the Israeli 
government. 
 The main dominant in the airport will be air passengers, but certainly, the airport 
will send and receive cargo as well, mostly high value cargo. 
Whether shipments are small or large, the integration in the MT operation is essential 
to overcome the physical and psychological barriers. 
 
Table 22: The approximate Road/Rail distance between the Gaza Strip and West Bank 
main cities 
 
From To Distance (Km) Days Rail Days Road 
Northern Gaza Hebron 54 0.113 0.030 
Northern Gaza Gaza Seaport 15 0.091 0.008 
Gaza Seaport Gaza Airport 33 0.100 0.017 
Gaza Airport Hebron 102 0.136 0.053 
Gaza Seaport Hebron 69 0.119 0.036 
Hebron Bethlehem 25 0.096 0.013 
Hebron Jerusalem 44 0.106 0.023 
Hebron Ramallah 48 0.333 0.250 
Hebron Jenin 120 0.146 0.063 
Source: Author 
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6.4 Total logistic cost 
The idea of total logistic cost has been derived from the dissertation logistics 
potential of the Aqaba special economic zone as a regional gateway by Sufian Atalah 
Al Muhaisen, in which the total logistic cost had been calculated for Aqaba Port. In 
this study the author will calculate the total logistic cost for each mode of 
transportation in the Palestinian state. 
Provision of door to door services and enhancing regional integration will bring 
benefits to the Palestinian economy. They will enable shippers to minimize the total 
logistic cost of the transportation process from origin to destination.  
Therefore, to identify the cost associated with shipments in the different alternatives 
explained above in sections 6.1 – 6.3 the following assumption will be considered: 
 
F FEU container imported from a to b 
D Ocean distance in nautical miles between a and b 
P Port charges and expenses per FEU container 
S Ocean freight rate per nautical mile 
X Inland transportation cost per Km for container, assumed to be USD 2.5  
Q Cross Border charges and expenses per container 
Dx Inland transportation distance in Km 
Ss Sea transportation speed in nautical miles/hour  
Sl Land transportation speed in Km/hour 
Wb Waiting time to cross border in days 
Ws Dwell time at port, assumed to be 5 days 
V Value of the cargo in dollar per F 
T Terminal charges per container 
I Inventory carrying cost of cargo values, assumed to be 15% 
 
Now, the total logistic cost can be mathematically defined using the following 
formula: 
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Total logistic cost= transportation cost + inventory carrying cost 
TLC = TC + ICC ………………………………… (1) 
6.4.1 Transport cost 
The transportation cost is defined as the sum of all expenses paid along the transport 
logistic chain from the origin to the destination. In this case transport cost includes 
ocean freight, port expenses, trucking transport and border crossing charges, as 
shown in the following formula: 
 
Transportation cost= ocean freight + port charges and expenses + cross border 
expenses + sum of land transportation 
 
TC = (S * D) + P + Q + T + ∑ (Dx * X)………………… (2) 
6.4.2 Inventory carrying cost  
Inventory carrying costs refer to the costs associated with carrying a quantity of 
inventory. It is well known that inventory carrying cost is part of the total logistic 
costs and this cost needs to be optimized in any logistic system. To calculate the 
inventory cost it is essential to know the total time spent during the transportation 
process. This includes the time spent at sea, time at border crossings, port dwell time 
and the time during land transportation, which is clear from the formula 
 
Total time in days = days at sea + port dwell time in days + border crossing time in 
days + inland transport time in days 
 
W = (D/24Ss) + Ws + Wb + (Dx/24Sl) ………………… (3) 
 
Then the inventory carrying cost will be derived from the following formula: 
Inventory carrying cost = ((Value of the cargo * Inventory carrying cost of cargo 
values)/365) * total time in days 
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ICC = ((V * I)/365) * W …………………………   (4) 
  
From equations 2, 3 and 4 equation (1) become 
TLC = (S * D) + P + Q + T + ∑ (Dx * X) + [((V * I)/365) * ((D/24Ss) + Ws + Wb +  
(Dx/24Sl))]…………………………………………………  (5) 
 
From equation 5 it is clear that the changes in different factors affect the total logistic 
cost such as location, value of goods, vessel speed, costs of land transportation and 
time costs (inventory). 
By applying this formula, the total logistic costs for the different economic hubs have 
been calculated and are shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3 Appendix B. From this it could 
be concludes that: 
• Land transportation is still the most expensive mode of transport, and this can 
be attributed more or less to the border crossing charges, and by reducing 
these charges, especially security charges, the land transportation could show 
competitiveness. 
• The territorial link should be constructed to serve the Palestinian integrity 
with land transportation 
• The seaport would be the best choice in regard to total logistic cost for 
imports and exports to the neighbouring countries. The total logistic cost to 
Cairo via land transportation is USD 1162, while in contrast, via the seaport it 
would cost USD 443 and the same is the case with Haifa and Beirut. 
• Imports and exports to Amman and Aqaba would be via land transportation 
to reduce time and avoid Suez Canal dues and more port charges. 
• The Egyptian ports would act as transhipment hubs for the Palestinian trade 
with Asian countries 
• The trade with European countries could be conducted directly through the 
seaport. From the calculation, the shipment of an FEU container from Gioia 
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Tauro to Jenin via Gaza Seaport would have a total logistic cost of 1,262 
USD. 
6.5 Information and communication technologies 
Intermodal transport system is not only the movement of cargo with more than one 
mode of transport, but also the exchange of information necessary to make the flow 
of cargo smooth and reliable (Muller, 1999). 
Information technology could be seen as the major supply chain driver, affecting 
deeply every part of the supply chain. ICT serves as the connection between the 
supply chain’s various stages to co-ordinate their activities to bring the lowest 
logistic cost as a total supply chain management. If management concentrates on 
improving information flow to enhance logistic efficiency and effectiveness it may 
be possible to satisfy all of the objectives of an efficient supply chain. Moreover, by 
linking members of the supply chain using ICT and sharing key data, it may be 
possible to achieve the following: 
• Increase customer satisfaction 
• Lower inventories 
• Speeding up the procedures 
• Decrease transportation costs 
• Decreasing time at border crossings 
The internet has become a popular tool in various trade and transport activities which 
have significant impacts on total logistic costs. Without exception the best logistic 
strategy would be to reduce the manual processes and increase automation to reduce 
delays and errors. ICTs are no less important than infrastructure developments. 
Internet based technology is enabling new levels of transaction automation and 
become demanded for global trade management. ICTs enhance efficient and 
effective transport trade logistics.  
Internet and mobile phones are now widely used; a survey carried out by PCBS, 
presented in Table 23, shows the percentages of internet connections and mobile 
phones in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The number of internet connections 
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itself cannot give a full picture of the diffusion in ICTs, since the high number of 
internet connections does not mean a high rate of e-commerce activities. Table 24 
shows that at present only 0.9 percent of the total population are using the internet 
for electronic commerce. Therefore, utilizing these technologies in transport and 
electronic commerce is very low and the Palestinian Authority should enhance and 
encourage the utilization of these technologies with the integrated multimodal 
transport operation. ICTs should be directed toward exchange of information and 
tracing goods during transit. One example of the use of ICT is the Advance Cargo 
Information System (ACIS). The system could improve transport efficiency by 
tracking equipment and cargo on transport modes and at the interface points, by 
providing information in advance.  
 
Table 23: Percentage of Households in the Palestinian Territory having some ICT 
services, 2004, 2006 
 
ICT Services 2004 2006 
Computer  24.6 32.8 
Internet  9.2 15.9 
Telephone Line 40.8 50.8 
Mobile phone  72.8 81 
Source: (PCBS, 2006) http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1318.pdf 
 
 Table 24: Percentage of persons in the Palestinian territory by the main purpose of 
using internet, 2006 
 
Main purpose Percentage 
Education 19.3 
Entertainment 16.5 
Acquaintance 15 
Work 9.3 
E-mailing 9.1 
Political issues 8.8 
Scientific issues 8.5 
Chatting 4.8 
Spiritual issues 2.4 
Updating programs 1 
Electronic commerce 0.9 
Others 1.2 
Source: (PCBS, 2006) http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1318.pdf 
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In order to facilitate the transport and have control over it from door to door, 
information and management systems should cover the several modes of transport. 
Harmonized communication standards, procedures, and transport documents on an 
electronic data interchange basis will increase the use of electronic transactions. 
Information technology should provide:  
• Communications between different operators in the system 
• Tracking and tracing consignment 
• Booking and reservation 
• Reduce information delays and errors 
At present, transport documents and procedures differ between modes and operators. 
The use of electronic based documents instead of paper based documents will 
provide an opportunity for creating harmonized system procedures. Moreover, using 
existing information technology such as short range communication and satellites in 
both Israel and Palestine to enhance the tracking and tracing of cargo across different 
modes will in turn meet the security concern requirements. 
 Another example is the Automated Cargo Expediting System (ACES) in the ports of 
New York and New Jersey. This system had been implemented to increase the 
efficiency and speed of cargo through the ports. The system provides information on 
location and status of international maritime shipments (arrival notice, manifests, 
delivery order from customhouse brokers, cargo status…). This linked with other 
modes of transport allows users to streamline the information management process 
(Muller, 1999).  
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN 
7 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to recover, the Palestinian economy is depending mainly on trade facilitation. 
Therefore, integrating Palestinian transport with the regional transportation system, 
with the aim to establish modern logistic services to connect the Palestinian territory 
with the rest of the world would be done through the following measures: 
• Infrastructure upgrade along the main corridors 
• Improving the efficiency of border management agencies 
• Optimization of information flow 
• Gaza seaport and Airport should be constructed 
7.1 New approached agreement 
The new agreement must have the commitment of both parties, the Palestinian and 
Israeli, to establish free Palestinian-Israeli trade, Palestinian control over it is own 
internal markets in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, control over its economic relations 
with third parties, and control over its border crossings with Israel and third countries 
are essential. The agreement would also include the gradual elimination of barriers to 
trade.   
The agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians has to address the following 
points: 
7.1.1 Border crossings regime  
? Normalized internal economic conditions which will influence the Palestinian 
economy 
? Palestinian internal trade must be free of physical and administrative burdens  
? Full and free access to the borders, as well as the full use of all existing roads 
and other infrastructure. 
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The Rafah and Allenby border crossings with Egypt and Jordan would need to have 
Palestinian and Egyptian administrations to handle the operation and ensure smooth 
flows of goods at the Rafah crossing and the Palestinian and Jordanian 
administrations at the Allenby crossing. And in order to address the Israeli security 
concerns both Palestine and Israel have to achieve a monitoring and control 
mechanism such as the presence of third party monitoring or a technological solution, 
but at the end the Palestinian Authority must control its own borders. 
Moreover, due to security concerns of the Israeli government there is an extensive 
closure policy and check points, which result in constraining and hindering the 
movement of goods and people. In addition, the border crossing facilities and 
procedures put in place by the Israeli government are mainly focused on security 
aspects. Consequently, it creates a costly and unreliable trade logistics and 
uncertainty at border crossings, which increase the transit time and reduce the 
opportunities for export. 
 Therefore,   it is necessary to introduce some measures that can facilitate the trade 
and at the same time enhance the security. This can be achieved by: 
? Developing the border crossings facilities 
? The use of advanced security technologies 
? New management procedures, which ensure that security requirements are 
met without unduly compromising the flow of trade 
7.1.1.1 Developing border facilities  
Improvements to the design and construction of the cargo transfer structures are 
required. A carefully planned layout has a significant effect on both efficiency and 
security. The layout should differ by type of crossing, since the volume and mix of 
vehicles will vary, and not all crossings require the same customs procedures. 
7.1.1.2 Using advanced technologies  
The technologies that can be used by the Israeli government as well as the 
Palestinian Authority for Palestinian exports to and through Israel, direct imports 
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from Jordan and Egypt and through international gateways can provide a method for 
checking cargo without removing it from the truck/container include: 
? Imaging systems (scanners). 
? Sniffer technology that can identify the presence of explosives in electronic 
devices. 
? Tamper-proof seals that ensure that containers have not been interfered with 
in transit, thus providing confirmation of the integrity of the container or 
truck.  
 
The extension of such technology will enable the flow of cargo while maintaining 
security at all border points between Israel and the Palestinian Territories, as well as 
between the Palestinian Territories and other countries.  
7.1.1.3 New management procedures  
The use of new management procedures supported by advanced technologies can 
enhance the flow of passengers and goods. These new management procedures might 
include the following: 
? If one gateway is closed for security reasons, an alternative gateway should 
be made available instead. 
? Performance indicators should be developed, taking into consideration in 
setting these indicators the involvement of commercial shippers, and 
international standards. These indicators could include the percentage of 
shipments inspected and average times for waiting and for an inspection. 
Service standards that can be applied at all crossings between Israel and 
Gaza/West Bank, and at all international gateways for Palestinian goods need 
to be enhanced.  
? Enhancing a secure supply chain by minimizing the number of inspected 
cargo by using sealing, and limiting inspections to ensuring that the seals are 
intact. This can be applied:  
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? For Palestinian imports, screening and sealing would be done at the 
international Israeli or Palestinian gateways. For Palestinian imports 
via Israeli gateways, direct movement of goods in sealed containers 
could be allowed under bond between the Israeli ports and the West 
Bank or Gaza. A security check would only be required at the port. 
From there, imports would be transported under customs seal directly 
to the relevant border crossing by truck where the collection of 
custom duties would be performed. The purpose is to remove the 
container from the port area as soon as possible, where goods are 
stored and labour and procedures are costly, and to move them 
towards their destination to avoid unnecessary delays.  
? For Palestinian exports and goods originating from Gaza or the West 
Bank, this would be done at the crossing point with Israel. 
 
? Using computer-based risk management systems to select shipments that 
require physical customs inspection. To be able to apply such a system an 
integrated data system is required. This system will be more effective if it can 
be introduced in coordination with Palestinian border security and customs 
officials.  
? Allowing truck trailers to circulate freely both in Israel and the West Bank 
and Gaza, and allowing containers to move door-to door. The introduction of 
a free-circulating trailer system would permit Israel to abolish the back-to-
back system of border cargo inspections without appreciable additional risk. 
Free circulating trailers could be used at all crossings between Israel and 
Gaza and the West Bank as well as for transit cargoes. 
In order to facilitate trade measures have to be taken to ensure smooth movement of 
goods through border crossings including cooperation and information sharing, 
scheduling and movement of cargo through the terminals, operational procedures and 
hours of working etc. 
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7.1.2 Modern integrated customs and security management 
 All borders with third parties and Israel must rely on modern and integrated customs 
and security management, supported by information technology. 
The development of the Palestinian customs procedures would benefit the Palestinian 
trade and enhance the security measures that concern the Israeli government.  
? Palestinian customs should assume responsibility for clearing cargo and 
collecting custom duties at the external borders of Gaza and the West Bank. 
? Strengthening the capacity of the Palestinian customs through a number of 
initiatives include building the skills of the Palestinian customs service 
through training programs developing the ASYCUDA system used by the PA 
customs.   
? Risk-analysis and selectivity (RAS) techniques should be introduced at all 
border crossings. Several studies have found that success rates in detecting 
fraud and crime, including illegal immigration and smuggling, are higher 
when RAS techniques are employed. These techniques allow most vehicles to 
be processed faster, while the selected vehicles can be removed from the 
queue to specialized buildings for inspection using risk and compliance 
management principles. The current focus on physical inspection should be 
replaced by post-release verification, including audit-based controls. While 
there will always be a need for some physical checking, it is preferable to 
encourage compliance by offering rapid transit for transactions deemed to be 
low risk, and to apply significant penalties to those who fail to comply. If 
traders know the requirements in advance, this would minimize delays and 
their associated costs. 
? Inter-agency cooperation at land borders is also needed to reduce the cost 
associated with multiple controls. Specific measures should include joint 
clearance and the appointment of a border-crossing manager for each border 
crossing. 
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? There should also be a special regime for transit traffic, with simplified 
documentation and truck seals. Clearance procedures at borders would be 
further reduced if there were more inland customs clearance centres. 
? Infrastructure deficiencies create additional bottlenecks. Investments might 
be needed to widen approach roads for facilities to allow several vehicles to 
be processed simultaneously, or for equipment to carry out required 
examinations on site. 
? Palestinian customs should adopt service standards in close cooperation with 
the Palestinian private sector. 
7.1.3  Territorial link between the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
Gaza and the West Bank are integral parts of the Palestinian economy. To gain an 
economic recovery and growth, the flow of people and goods between these two 
regions is essential. This would enhance the use of factors of production, including 
labour, more efficiently and as a result, create a larger effective internal market, and 
provide a pathway between the economy of the West Bank and a future seaport in 
Gaza. Several options exist for such a link including rail connections, tunnels, fenced 
roads, and simple road connections. Security along this corridor can be assured using 
a combination of container scanning and sealing technologies at the exit border, 
combined with vehicle tracking devices to monitor movement. The implementation 
of such a link would ensure a reduction in transit time. 
Unquestionably, the physical link between the two separated regions of the 
Palestinian territory should be established as soon as possible to guarantee the full 
economic integration. 
7.1.4 Gaza seaport and airport 
Palestinian exporters and importers should also have a direct access to the outside 
world. This would be done through the establishment of international sea and air 
gateways under Palestinian control, to provide an alternative to border crossings. 
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The World Bank has suggested that the reconstruction of the seaport could best be 
initiated through interim projects that are cheaper and faster to implement than a full 
service seaport. The Bank suggested developing an efficient Roll-On, Roll-Off (Ro-
Ro) container port with reliable shuttle services, constructing it in stages. The first 
stage would be a shallow draft (5 meter) terminal to serve Ro-Ro traffic. This would 
provide an outlet for containerized high-value cargo that is both time-sensitive and 
important to the growth of the economy. The characteristic of Ro-Ro shipping does 
not need extensive cargo-handling equipment, requires less berth space and less 
operating draft. Exported and imported containers would be delivered to Port Said or 
the SCCT terminal. From there, containers would be transferred onto mainline 
vessels. In the next stage the breakwater could be extended to allow construction of 
deepwater berths for container and bulk vessels. This would offer potentially faster 
and more reliable routes, but more importantly, would create a competitive 
alternative to the existing routes through Israel.  
Certainly, the physical infrastructures enabling the exchange of goods with the 
outside world should be started and agreed between the two parties. The investment 
in these infrastructures must be up to the standards to ensure the best possible 
services to all users and making the trade flow smooth. Moreover, the Law of the Sea 
Convention, customary international law and humanitarian law can be used to 
support air and sea access for importing and exporting goods under international 
supervision and secure operation. 
7.1.5 Third party relations 
The Palestinian relations with third parties should include new policies and trade 
initiatives to expand the labour market and trade facilitation with neighbouring 
countries. 
In this regard the scope of the Palestinian external trade policies should be widened 
beyond the Paris Protocol. Moreover, the EU and European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) can be used to support the expansion of external trade. Existing regional 
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initiatives such as the Barcelona7 or Euro Med process, which have as their main 
goal to establish free trade area, in which both Palestine and Israel are parties should 
be supported. 
But the experience of the Paris Protocol has provided lessons that an agreement 
between unequal parties is most likely to fail. In order to avoid such a situation it is 
important to take some measures for ensuring the implementation between the two 
parties such as  
? Including a third party who must have the power to ensure the 
implementation 
? Creation of an economic coordination committee, which represents a 
microcosm of the power disparity that exists on the macro level 
? The agreement must follow specific steps according to a time table to be 
implemented 
7.2 Approached solution for Jordan Valley 
The Jordan Valley, as has been discussed in the previous chapters, is a critical region 
for the West Bank economy and in turn for the Palestinian economy. For that, trade 
facilitation from and to this region should be the cornerstone of any suggested 
solutions. The solutions that can be done take three scenarios: short term, medium 
term and long term solutions. 
7.2.1 Short term solution 
The restriction on the movement of goods and people should be removed as follows: 
? The checkpoints at the entrance to Jericho should be removed 
? Palestinian trucks carrying products from the Jordan Valley should have 
access to all border crossings 
                                                 
7 The main objectives of the partnership: to build together and area of peace, security and shared 
prosperity. Progress towards this end is to be achieved by activities in the political area, the 
economic/financial area and the cultural/social sector 
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? Movement of agricultural goods from the Jordan Valley to all parts of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip should be allowed 
7.2.2 Medium term solution 
Further steps are needed to gain more benefit from this region by: 
? Eliminating all movement restrictions to the Jordan Valley 
? Improvement in road infrastructure between the northern West Bank and the 
Jordan Valley 
? Improvement of the road networks between Nablaus and Damia Bridge 
? Opening the Damia Bridge for exports of the Jordan Valley agricultural 
products 
? Access to the Allenby Bridge should be improved 
? Development and reconstruction of water infrastructure 
7.2.3 Long term solutions 
• Should be fully integrated as an economical development zone, 
having access to third countries. 
 
In order for the Palestinians to be ready for the changes, and be capable of taking the 
responsibility that will be given to them, it is important to develop the institutional 
capacity. The areas which need urgent developments are customs and border controls, 
standards and specifications, transportation networks and the border operation. 
Lastly, trade facilitation is the only torch that could light the way for the Palestinian 
economy to recover and achieve a competitive position. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A 
 
Table 1: Palestinian imports and exports from 1998 to 2007 (000 ton) 
 
 
Sector 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Import 1,979.25 2,506.02 1,985.67 1,694.71 1,263.01 1,500.22 1,994.39 2,222.31 2,362.50 2,170.83
Export 329.04 310.12 334.05 241.96 200.72 233.07 260.57 279.54 282.50 331.17
Total Trade 2,308.29 2,816.15 2,319.72 1,936.66 1,463.73 1,733.29 2,254.96 2,501.85 2,645.00 2,502.00  
Source: The Author 
Table 2: The annual average growth rate for the three scenarios 
 
High scenario PERCENTAGE 
ANNUAL IMPORT GROWTH 12.39% 
ANNUAL EXPORT GROWTH 10.64% 
ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH 11.52% 
Medium scenario PERCENTAGE 
ANNUAL IMPORT GROWTH 10.63% 
ANNUAL EXÅPORT GROWTH 9.01% 
ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH 9.82% 
Low scenario PERCENTAGE 
ANNUAL IMPORT GROWTH 7.38% 
ANNUAL EXPORT GROWTH 6.09% 
ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH 6.74% 
Source: The Author 
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Table 3: Forecasted traffic Volume for the period 2008-2025, three different scenarios 
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Import 2,387.92 2,626.71 2,889.38 3,178.32 3,496.15 3,845.76 4,230.34 4,653.37 5,118.71 5,630.58 6,193.64 6,813.00 7,494.31 8,243.74 9,068.11 9,974.92 10,972.41 12,069.65
Export 364.28 400.71 440.78 484.86 533.35 586.68 645.35 709.89 780.87 858.96 944.86 1,039.34 1,143.28 1,257.60 1,383.37 1,521.70 1,673.87 1,841.26
Total trad 2,752.20 3,027.42 3,330.16 3,663.18 4,029.50 4,432.45 4,875.69 5,363.26 5,899.59 6,489.54 7,138.50 7,852.35 8,637.58 9,501.34 10,451.47 11,496.62 12,646.28 13,910.91
Import 2,355.35 2,555.56 2,772.78 3,008.47 3,264.19 3,541.64 3,842.68 4,169.31 4,523.70 4,908.22 5,325.42 5,778.08 6,269.21 6,802.10 7,380.28 8,007.60 8,688.24 9,426.75
Export 359.32 389.86 423.00 458.95 497.96 540.29 586.21 636.04 690.10 748.76 812.41 881.46 956.39 1,037.68 1,125.88 1,221.58 1,325.42 1,438.08
Total trad 2,714.67 2,945.42 3,195.78 3,467.42 3,762.15 4,081.93 4,428.90 4,805.35 5,213.81 5,656.98 6,137.82 6,659.54 7,225.60 7,839.78 8,506.16 9,229.18 10,013.66 10,864.82
Import 2,301.08 2,439.15 2,585.50 2,740.63 2,905.06 3,079.37 3,264.13 3,459.98 3,667.58 3,887.63 4,120.89 4,368.14 4,630.23 4,908.05 5,202.53 5,514.68 5,845.56 6,196.29
Export 351.04 372.10 394.42 418.09 443.18 469.77 497.95 527.83 559.50 593.07 628.65 666.37 706.35 748.74 793.66 841.28 891.76 945.26
Total trad 2,652.12 2,811.25 2,979.92 3,158.72 3,348.24 3,549.13 3,762.08 3,987.81 4,227.08 4,480.70 4,749.54 5,034.52 5,336.59 5,656.78 5,996.19 6,355.96 6,737.32 7,141.56
Forecasted Period from 2008-2025 High Scenario
Forecasted Period from 2008-2025 Medium Scenario
Forecasted Period from 2008-2025 Low scenario
 Source: The Author 
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Table 4:  Forecasted Total Trade Traffic by type of cargo from 2008 – 2025 
 
Cargo Type 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Miscellaneous c 1,123 1,235 1,359 1,495 1,644 1,808 1,989 2,188 2,407 2,648 2,913 3,204 3,524 3,877 4,264 4,691 5,160 5,676
Dry Bulk 815 897 987 1,085 1,194 1,313 1,445 1,589 1,748 1,923 2,115 2,327 2,559 2,815 3,097 3,406 3,747 4,122
Oil Bulk 813.83 895.21 984.73 1,083.20 1,191.52 1,310.67 1,441.74 1,585.92 1,744.51 1,918.96 2,110.85 2,321.94 2,554.13 2,809.55 3,090.50 3,399.55 3,739.51 4,113.46
Total Trade 2,752.20 3,027.42 3,330.16 3,663.18 4,029.50 4,432.45 4,875.69 5,363.26 5,899.59 6,489.54 7,138.50 7,852.35 8,637.58 9,501.34 10,451.47 11,496.62 12,646.28 13,910.91
Cargo Type 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Miscellaneous c 1,108 1,202 1,304 1,415 1,535 1,665 1,807 1,961 2,127 2,308 2,504 2,717 2,948 3,199 3,471 3,766 4,086 4,433
Dry Bulk 804 873 947 1,027 1,115 1,209 1,312 1,424 1,545 1,676 1,819 1,973 2,141 2,323 2,520 2,735 2,967 3,219
Oil Bulk 802.73 870.96 944.99 1,025.32 1,112.47 1,207.03 1,309.62 1,420.94 1,541.72 1,672.77 1,814.95 1,969.23 2,136.61 2,318.22 2,515.27 2,729.07 2,961.04 3,212.73
Total Trade 2,714.67 2,945.42 3,195.78 3,467.42 3,762.15 4,081.93 4,428.90 4,805.35 5,213.81 5,656.98 6,137.82 6,659.54 7,225.60 7,839.78 8,506.16 9,229.18 10,013.66 10,864.82
Cargo Type 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Miscellaneous c 1,082 1,147 1,216 1,289 1,366 1,448 1,535 1,627 1,725 1,828 1,938 2,054 2,177 2,308 2,446 2,593 2,749 2,914
Dry Bulk 786 833 883 936 992 1,052 1,115 1,182 1,252 1,328 1,407 1,492 1,581 1,676 1,777 1,883 1,996 2,116
Oil Bulk 784.23 831.29 881.16 934.03 990.07 1,049.48 1,112.45 1,179.19 1,249.95 1,324.94 1,404.44 1,488.71 1,578.03 1,672.71 1,773.07 1,879.46 1,992.22 2,111.76
Total Trade 2,652.12 2,811.25 2,979.92 3,158.72 3,348.24 3,549.13 3,762.08 3,987.81 4,227.08 4,480.70 4,749.54 5,034.52 5,336.59 5,656.78 5,996.19 6,355.96 6,737.32 7,141.56
Forecasted Period from 2008-2025 High scenario
Forecasted Period from 2008-2025 Medium scenario
Forecasted Period from 2008-2025 Low scenario
 
Source: The Author 
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Table 5: Forecasted traffic for the Seaport by type of cargo from 2008 – 2025 
 
Cargo Type 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Miscellaneous 786 865 951 1,046 1,151 1,266 1,392 1,532 1,685 1,853 2,039 2,243 2,467 2,714 2,985 3,283 3,612 3,973
Dry Bulk 571 628 691 760 836 919 1,011 1,112 1,224 1,346 1,481 1,629 1,792 1,971 2,168 2,385 2,623 2,885
Oil Bulk 570 627 689 758 834 917 1,009 1,110 1,221 1,343 1,478 1,625 1,788 1,967 2,163 2,380 2,618 2,879
Total Trade 1,926.54 2,119.19 2,331.11 2,564.22 2,820.65 3,102.71 3,412.98 3,754.28 4,129.71 4,542.68 4,996.95 5,496.64 6,046.31 6,650.94 7,316.03 8,047.64 8,852.40 9,737.64
Cargo Type 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Miscellaneous 775 841 913 990 1,074 1,166 1,265 1,372 1,489 1,616 1,753 1,902 2,064 2,239 2,429 2,636 2,860 3,103
Dry Bulk 563 611 663 719 780 847 919 997 1,081 1,173 1,273 1,381 1,499 1,626 1,764 1,914 2,077 2,253
Oil Bulk 562 610 661 718 779 845 917 995 1,079 1,171 1,270 1,378 1,496 1,623 1,761 1,910 2,073 2,249
Total Trade 1,900.27 2,061.79 2,237.04 2,427.19 2,633.50 2,857.35 3,100.23 3,363.75 3,649.66 3,959.89 4,296.48 4,661.68 5,057.92 5,487.84 5,954.31 6,460.43 7,009.56 7,605.37
Cargo Type 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Miscellaneous 757 803 851 902 956 1,014 1,074 1,139 1,207 1,280 1,356 1,438 1,524 1,616 1,713 1,815 1,924 2,040
Dry Bulk 550 583 618 655 694 736 780 827 877 929 985 1,044 1,107 1,173 1,244 1,318 1,397 1,481
Oil Bulk 549 582 617 654 693 735 779 825 875 927 983 1,042 1,105 1,171 1,241 1,316 1,395 1,478
Total Trade 1,856.48 1,967.87 2,085.95 2,211.10 2,343.77 2,484.39 2,633.46 2,791.47 2,958.95 3,136.49 3,324.68 3,524.16 3,735.61 3,959.75 4,197.33 4,449.17 4,716.12 4,999.09
Forecasted Period from 2008-2025 High scenario for traffic through the Seaport
Forecasted Period from 2008-2025 Medium scenario for traffic through the Seaport
Forecasted Period from 2008-2025 Low scenario for traffic through the Seaport
 
Source: The Author 
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Appendix B 
Table 1:  Total logistic cost from the main ports in the Eastern Mediterranean to Gaza Seaport 
 
 S D P T Q Dx X V I Ss Ws Wb Sl ICC TC TLC 
Gioia Tauro 0.44 1008 100 200 0 0 0 50,000 0.15 24 5 0 0 138.70 743.52 882.22 
Port Said 0.44 85 100 200 0 0 0 50,000 0.15 24 5 0 0 105.77 337.40 443.17 
Malta Free port 0.44 992 100 200 0 0 0 50,000 0.15 24 5 0 0 138.13 736.48 874.61 
Piraeus 0.44 624 100 200 0 0 0 50,000 0.15 24 5 0 0 125.00 574.56 699.56 
Limassol 0.44 158 100 200 0 0 0 50,000 0.15 24 5 0 0 108.38 369.52 477.90 
Taranto 0.44 963 100 200 0 0 0 50,000 0.15 24 5 0 0 137.09 723.72 860.81 
Beirut 0.44 173 100 200 0 0 0 50,000 0.15 24 5 0 0 108.91 376.12 485.03 
Tortuous 0.44 236 100 200 0 0 0 50,000 0.15 24 5 0 0 111.16 403.84 515.00 
Haifa 0.44 105 100 200 0 0 0 50,000 0.15 24 5 0 0 106.49 346.20 452.69 
Source: Author 
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Table 2:  Total logistic cost from the main economic hubs to main cities in the Palestinian state via road 
 
 S D P T Q Dx X V I Ss Ws Wb Sl ICC TC TLC 
Northern Gaza - Hebron 0 0 0 0 0 54 2.5 50,000 0.15 0 0 0 80 0.58 135.00 135.58 
Northern Gaza -Seaport 0 0 0 0 0 15 2.5 50,000 0.15 0 0 0 80 0.16 37.50 37.66 
Gaza Seaport - Air port 0 0 0 0 0 33 2.5 50,000 0.15 0 0 0 80 0.35 82.50 82.85 
Gaza Airport - Hebron 0 0 0 0 0 102 2.5 50,000 0.15 0 0 0 80 1.09 255.00 256.09 
Gaza Seaport - Hebron 0 0 0 0 0 69 2.5 50,000 0.15 0 0 0 80 0.74 172.50 173.24 
Hebron - Bethlehem 0 0 0 0 0 25 2.5 50,000 0.15 0 0 0 80 0.27 62.50 62.77 
Hebron - Jerusalem 0 0 0 0 0 44 2.5 50,000 0.15 0 0 0 80 0.47 110.00 110.47 
Hebron - Ramallah 0 0 0 0 0 48 2.5 50,000 0.15 0 0 0 80 0.51 120.00 120.51 
Hebron - Jenin 0 0 0 0 0 120 2.5 50,000 0.15 0 0 0 80 1.28 300.00 301.28 
Source: Author 
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Table 3:  Total logistic cost from the main economic hubs to main economic hubs in the Palestinian state via road 
 
  S D P T Q Dx X V I Ss Ws Wb Sl ICC TC TLC 
Amman- Hebron 0 0 0 0 360 100 2.5 50,000 0.15 0 0 1 80 21.62 610.00 631.62 
Aqaba - Hebron 0 0 0 0 360 373 2.5 50,000 0.15 0 0 1 80 24.54 1,292.50 1,317.04
Tel Aviv - Hebron 0 0 0 0 466 67 2.5 50,000 0.15 0 0 0.5 80 10.99 633.50 644.49 
Beirut - Jenin 0 0 0 0 466 160 2.5 50,000 0.15 0 0 3 80 63.36 866.00 929.36 
Haifa - Jenin 0 0 0 0 466 48 2.5 50,000 0.15 0 0 0.5 80 10.79 586.00 596.79 
Damascus - Jenin 0 0 0 0 466 165 2.5 50,000 0.15 0 0 3 80 63.41 878.50 941.91 
Cairo - Rafah 0 0 0 0 250 355 2.5 50,000 0.15 0 0 1 80 24.35 1,137.50 1,161.85
Source: Author 
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Appendix C 
STUDY OF THE COMPETITION LEVEL ON THE EASTERN 
MEDITERRANEAN PORTS 
 
Conducted By: The Author 
 
Ports throughput  
The most important factor that can be used to assess the competitiveness of the ports 
is the port throughput. The development of the ports’ throughput 2003 to 2007 is 
shown in Table1.  The largest hub in the Eastern Mediterranean region is Gioia 
Tauro's Medcenter Container Terminal (MCT) with a throughput of 3.2 million TEU 
in 2005 and 2.9 million TEU in 2006, 7% less than in 2005, a disappointing result 
that reflects more than anything the rising competition of SCCT. However, it 
increased again in 2007 to 3.7 million TEU.  
 
Table 1:  Total container throughput in the Eastern Mediterranean ports 2005-2007 
(1000 TEU) 
No. port 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Avg. growth
1 Damietta 955.1 1,263 1,130.20 840.7 913.4 1.19%
2 Suez Canal Terminal – – 19 691.7 1,646.40 1,506.60 1223.35%
3 Gioia Tauro 3,149 3,261 3,161 2,900 3,700* 4.95%
4 Taranto 685,5 763.3 716.9 892.3 384.5 -6.79%
5 Limassol 255.1 298.1 320.1 360.8 365.5 9.56%
6 Piraeus 1,605 1,542 1,394.50 1,403.40 1,380* -3.63%
7 Malta Free port 1,300 1,461 1,321 1,600 1,900 10.67%
8 Haifa 679.2 1,033 1,107.50 1,053,1 1,142.70 15.72%
8,629 9,640 9,843 10,697 11,293 8,629Total  
Source: Containerization International yearbook, 2007, 2008. The Author 
* Source: lloydslist.com 
 
MCT, with the port’s authority, are trying to be in a more competitive and reliable 
position as a hub by investing together to improve the port infrastructure, to develop 
a new 400m berth, with 18m water depth and enlarging the channel to MCT by 70m 
in addition to investing in five new super panamax gantry cranes and 38 straddle 
carriers (Woodbridge, 2007). The Suez Canal Container Terminal (SCCT) has shown 
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a colour picture since it opened in 2004 where in 2006 it handled 1.6 million TEU, 
more than double the 2005 Figure. SCCT terminal is gaining more traffic Table1, 
where a key customer of the Gioia Tauro, APM Maersk has switched a remarkable 
amount of transhipment services for the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea to 
SCCT, enhancing new competition by the Suez Canal container terminal (SCCT) to 
Gioia Tauro. In 2007, SCCT added three super-post-panamax ship-to-shore container 
cranes to increase its capacity to 12. This development has increased the capacity of 
the terminal up to 2.25 Million TEU annually. At the same time SCCT has signed a 
concession for phase II, to double the terminal capacity to 5.1 Million TEU a year 
when it opens, probably in 2009, with a 2400m of quay, depth of 17.5m, 24 ship to 
shore gantry cranes capable of reaching 22 rows containers across and 67 RTGs. The 
throughput of Damietta Container Terminal (DCT) in 2007 was 913.4 thousand TEU 
as compared to 1.13 million TEU in 2005. This shows a decline in the throughput, 
due to the development of SCCT. To increase the competition the Damietta New 
Container Terminal (DNCT) project will improve the facilities with 2,360m of quay 
line, with a draft of 18m, 22 super-post-panamax cranes and 55 RTG units. This 
development in the terminal will be divided into phases and by the end of 2009 the 
terminal will be of a capacity reaching 2.5 million TEU a year, and with a further 
development this could rise to 4 million TEU annually (Woodbridge, 2007). Taranto 
Container Terminal (TCT) with its main customer Evergreen was growing faster in 
2006 than the other ports in the region, with a 24.5% upturn compared with 2005, 
handling over 890,000TEU. But in 2006 the throughput showed a significant decline 
to 384,462 TEU due to the increase in the competition in the region. Moreover, the 
company’s decision to offer a direct-call link to eastern Mediterranean ports, has 
actually affected the terminal by some transhipment boxes previously handled at 
TCT being redirected. At this time TCT is trying to offer a competitive service to 
other carriers looking for a regional hub status, by investing in dredging the berths 
down to 16.5m to handle larger container vessels. Moreover the terminal is having a 
negotiation with the port authority to include an additional 550m of quay into the 
terminal. Malta Freeport container terminal as a regional Mediterranean hub has 
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gained more advantage since it became controlled by the CMA CGM group. In 2006, 
the Malta Freeport container terminal handled 1.49 million TEU, as compared to the 
2005 throughput of 1.32 million TEU, which gives an increase of more than 12%. 
This increase in the volume is attributed to new services by CMA CGM. Investments 
in the coming years have been planned by Malta Freeport (EUR40 million) to 
increase the annual capacity to more than 3 million TEU. Moreover, five new 
quayside cranes have been ordered and 20 more RTGs are expected to be delivered 
along with an increase of the length of its container quays to over 3,000 meters.  In 
addition, there will be an extension to 318m length for the West Quay, with a water 
depth of 13m. This development will allow the port to handle main container lines at 
this quay. Piraeus is a main regional hub for Greece, for MSC in particular. The 
rapid increase in the port throughput has overloaded its capacity, resulting in 
industrial disruption and transhipment shifting to other locations. Consequently, the 
Geneva-based carrier is routing significantly more cargo through Gioia Tauro. The 
port of Piraeus is enhancing different developments for its handling facilities to 
increase the capacity by 1 million TEU a year. An extension to the Pier 1 is 
scheduled to be completed by the third quarter of 2008, with three new super-post 
panamax container cranes (Woodbridge, 2007). In 2007 the Haifa Port handled 
1,142,700 TEU which is an increase as compared to 2006 where the port handled 
1,053,094 TEU. The port authority mission for 2008 is to increase the throughput to 
reach 1.5 million TEU by increasing the number of gantry cranes in the Eastern 
Terminal by two Post Panamax units, increase the number of gantry cranes in the 
Western Terminal by one units, Adding 25% storage capacity to Eastern Terminal 
and developing Kishon East Terminal with three Gantry cranes and two shore cranes 
for small/ medium size container and bulk vessels (Haifa, 2006). 
Market share  
The market share of each port has been calculated as a percentage of the total 
throughput of the other ports (see Table3). 
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Table 3: Total container market share in the Eastern Mediterranean ports 2003-2007 
 
No. port 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1 Damietta 11.1% 13.1% 11.5% 7.9% 8.1%
2 Suez Canal Terminal 0.0% 0.2% 7.0% 15.4% 13.3%
3 Gioia Tauro 36.5% 33.8% 32.1% 27.1% 32.8%
4 Taranto 7.9% 7.9% 7.3% 8.3% 3.4%
5 Limassol 3.0% 3.1% 3.3% 3.4% 3.2%
6 Piraeus 18.6% 16.0% 14.2% 13.1% 12.2%
7 Malta Free port 15.1% 15.2% 13.4% 15.0% 16.8%
8 Haifa 7.9% 10.7% 11.3% 9.8% 10.1%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: the Author 
 
Gioia Tauro is the market leader in the selected region with the highest market share, 
although it declined from 32.1% in 2005 to 27.1% in 2006 but started picking up 
again in 2007 with a market share of 32.8%. This can be due to the high level of 
competition in the region, especially from SCCT which has shown an increase in the 
market share from 7% in 2005 to reach up to 13.3% in 2007. However, a strong 
competition still exists between hub ports in the region. In 2007, Malta Port and 
Piraeus recorded market shares of 16.8% and 13.3%, respectively. Meanwhile, the 
Damietta terminal market share declined in 2006 to 7.9% but recovered in 2007 to 
reach 8.1%. At the same time Haifa Port started off getting more market shares in 
2007 after a decline in 2006. The changes in the market shares between the ports 
evidence a high degree of competition which will be for the benefit of the market. At 
the same time, all these ports are investing more in handling facilities to improve 
their performance level to gain more market shares. 
 
Market concentration 
 
To measure the degree of competition in the market between the ports, the 
Herfindahl index (H) will be used. It is defined as the sum of the squared market 
shares of an individual company (n). It can range from (1/n) to 1, when if H=1, the 
firm is a totally monopolistic organization and as it decreases as the degree of 
competition increases (Cariou, 2008a). 
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Table 4: East Mediterranean transhipment container market concentration Herfindahl 
index (H) in 2005, 2007 
 
No. Port 2005  
Throughput
2007 
Throughput
Market 
Share 2005
Market 
Share 
2007
H 2005 H 2007
1 Damietta 1,130.20 913.4 11.5% 8.1% 0.0132 0.0065
2 Suez Canal Terminal 691.7 1,506.60 7.0% 13.3% 0.0049 0.0178
3 Gioia Tauro 3,161 3,700 32.1% 32.8% 0.1031 0.1074
4 Taranto 716.9 384.5 7.3% 3.4% 0.0053 0.0012
5 Limassol 320.1 365.5 3.3% 3.2% 0.0011 0.0010
6 Piraeus 1,394.50 1,380 14.2% 12.2% 0.0201 0.0149
7 Malta Free port 1,321 1,900 13.4% 16.8% 0.0180 0.0283
8 Haifa 1,107.50 1,142.70 11.3% 10.1% 0.0127 0.0102
Source: The Author 
 
Table 4 indicates that the in 2005 the Herfindahl index was relatively small (0.17836) 
which means that the market was highly competitive in such a period. This shows the 
high degree of competition among the terminal operators. However, although the 
SCCT and Gioia Tauro market shares increased to 13.3% and 32.8% respectively in 
2007, the Piraeus market share decreased to 12.2% and Haifa Port also increased. 
This makes the concentration greater in SCCT and Gioia Tauro.  
Nevertheless, competition between terminal operators has some what decreased as 
the Herfindahl index increased to 0.1874 in 2007, but a high degree of competition 
still exists. This shows a positive impact on the ports’ clients in terms of service 
being provided, port dues and terminal handling charges. Certainly, the ports’ 
throughput and market share significantly indicate the level of competition of a port. 
Location also has a significant impact on its attractiveness and competitiveness. 
Port location 
 
The ability to service transhipment trade is a very essential element in selecting the 
port which also plays a vital role in port competition. Most of the ports which are the 
largest transhipment centres such as Singapore resulted from advantageous location 
on the trade route and the proximity to regional centres of origin and destination. 
Malta free port and Gioia Tauro established their transhipment market position in the 
Mediterranean as a result of their location on the Asia-Europe trade route and 
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proximity to the markets of Southern Europe and Northern Africa. Several ports in 
the Eastern Mediterranean such as SCCT, Damietta, and Haifa are strongly 
competing with Malta free port and Gioia Tauro for regional transhipment trade 
(World Bank, 2007). 
 
Table5: Deviation Distance from the main trade route in the Eastern Mediterranean 
transhipment ports 
NO From Suez Canal To the port (nm) To Gibralter
Port 1976
1  Damietta  94 1928
2 SCCT  65 1911
3 Gioia Tauro  1018 1031
4 Taranto 997 1229
5 Limassol 272 1886
6 Piraeus  653 1482
7 Malta Free port 997 984
8 Haifa 230 2003
Deviation distance (nm)
46
0
5
257
73
250
182
159
 Source: Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay, (2008). Distance tables 
 
The location of the port from the main trade route is an essential element to asses the 
competitiveness of the port. As Table5 shows, the deviation distance from the main 
trade route in the Mediterranean region, the best scoring ports are SCCT, Damietta, 
Malta and Gioia Tauro. For SCCT the deviation distance from the route is zero, 
which makes it best choice to be a hub port in the Mediterranean region, especially 
with the increase in the fuel prices, the shipping company will be able to reduce its 
cost with no deviation from the route. In contrast, Piraeus, Limassol, Haifa, and 
Taranto are less competitive as transhipment hubs serving the East Mediterranean 
when it comes to deviation from main routes. Therefore, the closer the port is to the 
main route, the higher is its competitive advantage in the market, with consideration 
to the accessibility and infrastructure of the port. 
Port accessibility, terminal infra and superstructure 
 
The economy of scale in container vessels has played main roles in selecting the port 
that can host these large vessels especially the depth and quay length in which the 
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size has increased from 1980 on average from 2000 TEU to 13000 TEU now The 
accessibility of any specific container port relates to the potential or opportunities for 
the movement of containerized cargoes to and from other container ports. The 
examination of port accessibility is, therefore, a key element in the geographical 
analysis of the worldwide container transportation system. It is also a particularly 
relevant aspect of port competitiveness since the level of throughput at any container 
port is significantly and positively correlated to its accessibility (Wang & Cullinane, 
2008). 
The greater the level of accessibility the best cost effective it will be, and give the 
advantage to the port to be more attractive which will influencing the port 
competition.  
The accessibility of the port depends mainly on the depth of the water i.e. the larger 
the vessel the more depth it requires. From Table 6 SCCT and Piraeus having the 
maximum depth of 16.5m and Malta free port with depth of 15.5m which give them 
an advantage over other terminals, but still many of these terminals are going into 
dredging projects to increase their depth such as Gioia Tauro. 
 
Table 6: The container terminal infrastructure of the Eastern Mediterranean 
transhipment 
NO  Port  
 Terminal 
throughput 
(2007) 1000 
TEU  
 Quay 
length (m)  
 Maximum 
depth (m)  
 No. of 
gantry 
cranes  
 
Terminal 
area (ha) 
 Storage 
capacity 
(TEU)  
1  Damietta  913.4 1050  14.5  11  60  30,000  
2 SCCT  1,506.60 1200  16.5  12  60  24,000
3 Gioia Tauro  3,700 3011 15 18   130  60,000  
4 Taranto 384.5 1500 14.3 10 95 39000
5 Limassol 365.5 1695 14 4 34.25 10,000
6 Piraeus  1,380 3980 16.5 15   90  30,500  
7 Malta Free port 1,900 2258 15.5 18 61.5 16,907
8 Haifa 1,142.70 1360 14 12 50 16,800
Source: Containerization international yearbook, (2008) 
*http://www.maltafreeport.com.mt/TerminalTwo.asp 
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Table 6 shows the container terminal infrastructure of each terminal under 
consideration, showing the competitive advantage in regard to the quay length, 
maximum depth, number of gantry cranes, terminal area and storage capacity.  
First, the terminal area shows the capability of the port to handle containers inland 
such as loaded, unloaded, stored and transported; the second element is the quay 
length where containers are loaded or unloaded from or to the vessels; this length has 
a direct effect on the capacity of the terminal. The standard each 1 meter can handle 
is around 800 TEU with a variation from port to port depending on the infrastructure 
and equipment used. Thirdly, the maximum depth of the sea makes it possible to 
receive the largest types of containers giving more advantage to the terminal; 
fourthly, the storage area where containers are transported and stacked (Kaysi & 
Mahmassani, July 2001). 
Table 6 shows that the SCCT, Gioia Tauro and Malta free port are the most 
important ports in the region. The Table includes infrastructure elements, which play 
a major role in determining the capacity and level of service of a container terminal 
in a port, thus affecting a shipping line’s decision to use that particular port. 
 
Evaluating the efficiency of the ports using DEA 
When evaluating the level of competition between the ports, these elements has to be 
considered collectively rather than individually (Cariou, 2008a), such as from the 
analysis above of throughput, market share, port location and accessibility and 
infrastructure. It is clear that Gioia Tauro is the market leader in the East 
Mediterranean in terms of throughput and market share as well as terminal 
infra/super structure; it has less competitive advantage than Marsaxlokk and SCCT in 
terms of port location and accessibility. 
To analyze the competition in the main hub ports in the Eastern Mediterranean 
region using the Data Envelopment Analysis Technique using CRS model, the data 
in Table 5 are used as benchmarking criteria with input factors, quay length, terminal 
depth, terminal area, storage capacity and number of gantry cranes. And the terminal 
throughput in 2007 has been used as the output.  The DEA technique uses a 0 to 1 
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scale in order to benchmarking the efficiency of different firms. The result of DEA 
technique in Table 7 shows that SCCT, Gioia Tauro, and Malta free port the most 
efficient in terms of infra and superstructure. They had achieved the maximum level 
of utilization by using their facilities with an efficiency of 1. Damietta, Haifa, 
Limassol and Piraeus are relatively less efficient with scores vary between 0.53 – 
0.69 the other ports are showing the lowest efficiency, Taranto with 0.207.   
 
Table7: Ports efficiency using CRS 
 Damietta  0.69288 0.606 SCCT  
SCCT  1.00000 1.000 SCCT  
Gioia Tauro  1.00000 1.000 Gioia Tauro  
Taranto 0.20783 0.044 SCCT  
Limassol 0.53515 0.078 Gioia Tauro  
Piraeus  0.60825 0.232 Gioia Tauro  
Malta Free port 1.00000 1.000 Malta Free port
Haifa 0.83817 0.369 SCCT  
DMU Name Optimal Lambdaswith BenchmarksEfficency
 
Source: The author 
 
Table8: input Slacks using CRS 
DMU Name  Quay length (m)  Maximum depth (m) No. of gantry cranes  Terminal area (ha)   Storage capacity (TEU)  
 Damietta  0.00000 0.04330 0.34644 5.19656 6235.87643
SCCT  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Gioia Tauro  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Taranto 0.00000 0.95094 0.00000 5.91991 1889.32610
Limassol 580.17282 5.68755 0.00000 5.70453 0.00000
Piraeus  1101.88355 2.29537 0.00000 7.70258 0.00000
Malta Free port 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Haifa 0.00000 0.85751 0.07201 0.77151 0.00000
Source: the Author 
 
Table 8 shows how much the slack in the input factors as a proportion with the output, in 
which the port has to reduce to be efficient. But still the result is not considering the future 
demand of the port, which the port may be investing in to satisfy future needs even if they 
are not using it now (Cariou, 2008b). 
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Table9: Ports scale efficiency 
Input-Oriented
VRS
Efficiency
 Damietta  1.00000 0.69288 0.6929
SCCT  1.00000 1.00000 1.0000
Gioia Tauro  1.00000 1.00000 1.0000
Taranto 0.97902 0.20783 0.2123
Limassol 1.00000 0.53515 0.5351
Piraeus  0.85411 0.60825 0.7121
Malta Free port 1.00000 1.00000 1.0000
Haifa 1.00000 0.83817 0.8382
Efficency CRS Scale efficency
DMU Name
 
Source: The author 
 
The technical efficiency which has been derived from the CRS should be divided 
into pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency which can be obtained by the 
difference between CRS and VRS (Cariou, 2008b).  
Table 9 shows that Taranto Port deficiency can be explained by pure technical 
deficiency rather than scale deficiency where Piraeus can be a small portion of its 
deficiency explained by scale deficiency. The other terminals which are less efficient; 
most of its inefficiency is explained by technical inefficiency not due to scale 
inefficiency; in other words, because the proportion of input to output is not good 
(Cariou, 2008b). 
 
 
 
